Dr Brendan Nelson has been announced as the new President of Boeing Australia, New Zealand and South Pacific, succeeding Maureen Dougherty who will retire in March.

Dr Nelson comes to the role as the former Director of the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. He has previously served as the leader of the federal Liberal Party in opposition, as federal Defence Minister and Minister for Education, Science and Training, and as the Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg, the European Union and NATO. Dr Nelson was previously a medical practitioner and surgeon before leading the Australian Medical Association (AMA), and then being elected to federal parliament in 1996.

“Boeing is proud to have Brendan join our team after his many years of outstanding public and private sector service,” president of Boeing International Sir Michael Arthur said in a statement. “His proven ability to understand and manage complex situations – first as a medical doctor, later as a government leader and diplomat – will be put to good use as he leads Boeing Australia, the company’s largest presence outside the US and home to a large engineering and technical staff.

“Brendan takes up the mantle from Maureen Dougherty, who has done a superb job over the past six years leading our regional efforts, growing our relationships with customers and other stakeholders, and ensuring that Boeing in Australia thrives for many years ahead.”

Dr Nelson said, “It is an honour to join a global company like Boeing whose proud legacy here in Australia dates back more than 90 years to the earliest days of Australian aircraft manufacturing. Today, Boeing Australia employees are working across the country in high-tech jobs that help define and deliver the future of aviation and defence – not just for Australian customers but for the world.”

Maureen Dougherty is a highly-regarded mechanical engineer, graduating with a master’s degree from the University of Washington. She was appointed to her current role in February 2014 after leading Boeing’s KC-46A, 737 AEW&C, and F-22 Raptor programs.

This article appeared in the September-October 2019 issue of ADBR

by Max Blenkin 

ANAO report finds the OneSKY ATM system is not good value for money 

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) has found the major OneSKY project to unify civil and military air space under a single air traffic management (ATM) system could cost more than $4 billion. 

The OneSKY project was launched in 2009 with initial plans for it to be operational in 2015, but that is now looking more like 2026. 

“There is inadequate assurance that the contracted acquisition price is consistent with a value for money outcome for the capability being acquired,” an ANAO report released on July 31 said. 

But both Defence and Airservices – the procurement lead – have disagreed. Defence said the procurement adequately demonstrated value for money, while Airservices said it had acquitted its obligation in making all reasonable inquiries to ensure the contract represented value for money. 

OneSKY aims to replace two outdated air traffic control systems – covering civil and military airspace – with a single unified civil-military air traffic management system (CMATS). Airservices launched the procurement process in 2010 and, following an evaluation of tenders, Thales was selected to deliver the project. The $1.32 billion acquisition contract was signed in February 2018. 

At that time, Airservices estimated total project costs of $1.517 billion. But the ANAO report now puts the final cost at more than $4.11 billion, taking into account procurement costs, support of existing and new systems, and contingencies. 

The delay in OneSKY has required Airservices to extend the life of its existing air traffic management system through a hardware refresh and extension to support arrangements. The refresh was launched in 2016 and runs to December 2021. In December 2018, Airservices extended the system life again, this time to December 2024. The total cost of these refreshes is more than $140 million. 

Throughout, OneSKY has been marked by problems. In May 2017, then Defence Minister Marise Payne placed the Defence side of OneSKY – Project AIR 5431 Phase 3 – on the Projects of Concern list, although it was subsequently removed in May 2018. 

ANAO noted the long delays in getting the project off the ground and scope changes along the way. “Important changes were made, after the successful tenderer was selected, to the timeframe for delivery, scope of work, type of contract and price,” it said. 

“An appropriate governance framework was established to evaluate whether negotiations had resulted in contract terms that represent value for money. Shortcomings in the application of that framework mean that value for money has not been adequately demonstrated.” 

For its part, Defence said the final price was higher than it had forecast and, rather than seek a further budget increase, it instead sought scope reductions. These included removing system contingency capability and potentially accepting lower cost non-CMATS solutions in some Defence airfield control towers. 

Defence said this would not appreciably reduce the benefits for Australia nor impact on the ability to deliver safe and efficient air traffic management. In a response to the report, Airservices chairman John Weber said the ANAO had identified some areas where, with benefit of hindsight, it could have better documented its decision-making. “However, that would not have materially impacted the decision-making process nor the substance of the evidence relied on by the Board as decision maker nor the outcome,” he said. 

Mr Weber said what Airservices had embarked on was a large and complex procurement with highly technical requirements and a limited market of suppliers on behalf of two agencies with different requirements, funding arrangements and governance structures. 

He said air traffic control systems were not an off-the-shelf product and were unique to each country. “In this circumstance, the value for money considerations are necessarily broad and must include supplier market maturity, the specialist nature of the capability required and the level of risk.” 

And it seems this isn’t just a problem unique to Australia. Mr Weber said the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) air traffic modernisation program was running more than a decade late and had so far cost US$7 billion, 100 per cent more than the initial budget. 

In a joint response to the ANAO report, Defence Department Secretary Greg Moriarty and Chief of Defence Force (CDF) GEN Angus Campbell said there was room to enhance administrative arrangements supporting documenting actions and decisions in such a complex program. 

“Defence maintains however that is procurement of a Civil and Military Air Traffic Management and Control System adequately demonstrates value for money,” they said. 

By Dougal Robertson 

This article appeared in the November-December 2019 issue of ADBR

Defence industry and the military must embrace and exploit new and emerging information-gathering techniques to keep abreast of rapid technological change. The effective use of open source intelligence can provide a competitive edge if effectively prioritised, tasked and managed. 

In July 2014 Ukrainian separatists shot down a civilian Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777, MH-17 over eastern Ukraine while it was flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. In the confused aftermath, Russian government and intelligence services denied and attempted to disguise the involvement of Russian military personnel in the catastrophe.  

Initial investigations by the Dutch Safety Board struggled to gain access to the area where the aircraft had been destroyed, and little credible information was available on the cause of the crash. Shortly after, a small website supported by citizen journalists began to establish the facts surrounding MH-17.  

The UK-based investigative website Bellingcat identified and tracked the 9K37 Buk-M1 (NATO reporting name SA-11) surface to air missile (SAM) system from its garrison located in Russia to the eastern Ukraine, located the field where the missile was launched from, and identified suspects involved in the incident. The conclusions published by Bellingcat pre-empted the findings of the criminal investigation led by the Dutch Ministry of Justice – and were all drawn from publicly available information. 

Widespread publicity surrounding Bellingcat’s findings – helped in some measure by the unsophisticated Russian counter-factuals put onto the internet – identified open source information as a credible intelligence source for business and governments.  

In parallel with the exponential growth of internet-connected devices over the last decade, open source intelligence, or OSINT has become synonymous with social media aggregation and internet data-mining. Vendors and companies now specialise in the aggregation and filtering of ‘user analysis’, or the depiction of network structures.  

But what has been sidelined as internet research becomes automated and focused on ‘big data’, is the traditional, or capabilities-based assessment, provided through a functional application of open source intelligence across multiple data points. 

WHAT IS OSINT? 

Open source intelligence is information gained for advantage through publicly available or ‘open’ sources. Open source information is obtained using ethical means; that is, not through the use of agents, or controlled, or compromised sources.  

Before the rise of signals intelligence, or SIGINT in the mid-20th century, OSINT was simply ‘intelligence’. For example, Rudyard Kipling’s Kim (and even George MacDonald Fraser’s Flashman) were tasked with describing and assessing the capabilities of the various tribes of Afghanistan, and determining the intentions and expectations of Imperial Russia and Germany. They received their priorities from the government and military, collected information, and turned this into intelligence by selecting or removing specific data points, processed what they received and prepared reports, added their assessment, and disseminated the report back to customers in Peshawar, Delhi and London.  

This was the intelligence cycle in action, describing military and political facts, assessing capabilities and attempting to understand intentions. Until the rapid growth of technical collection, intelligence was largely seen as an art. However, the process of intelligence is a science. 

THE APPLICATION OF OSINT 

Intelligence can be used for four purposes: descriptive (what or where something is), capabilities (what something can do), intentions (what someone plans to do) and expectations (what we think they will do). The payoff from getting each of these right increases in inverse proportion to the likelihood of success. To understand intention and describe expectations, analysts must predict the future.  

Due to the multitude of complex variables involved in this prediction, consistent predictive analysis is impossible for all but the most experienced intelligence analysts – and history is littered with ‘intelligence failures’. 

For example, very few (perhaps one or two) Israeli Defence Force analysts predicted an attack by Egypt across the Suez Canal in October 1973, let alone a combined Arab attack on two fronts. But multiple intelligence sources had confirmed troop and equipment movement prior to the attack, and intelligence reporting existed on the capabilities of new Soviet equipment such as the Russian 2K12 Kub (NATO SA-6) SAM system.  

The outcome of the Yom Kippur War is contested – was it ultimately a victory for the IDF on the battlefield, or a failure of preparation across the Israeli defence establishment? But it is clear that an understanding of capability would have provided clear information to prepare for the threat. The IDF could not predict the future, but it could have developed a plan based on a realistic understanding of what could happen in the future based on adversary technical capability. This is capabilities analysis. 

Intentions and expectations are extremely difficult and expensive to understand. They can be subject to observer bias and deception by an adversary or opponent. Capabilities analysis is potentially more accessible, at a lower cost, and can be delivered through OSINT. This may be entirely as an ‘open’ product if used for business intelligence, or as a supplement to classified reporting for government and military intelligence. Capabilities analysis – the breaking down of complex problems into specific questions – is a useful analytical start-point. And the source for capabilities analysis is capabilities intelligence. 

USING OSINT FOR CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS 

Capabilities intelligence consists of the observation of ‘things’. Before the internet age, we considered things such as military equipment as existing within a system. Understanding the system – the human decision-maker – was the most important goal, as this would give us intent. Listing equipment was a means to divining this end, such as the meticulous counting of the Soviet bomber fleet during the Cold War. 

Now, with the advent of network technologies we need a more defined typology. A way of framing the problem is to characterise the science of intelligence as mapping objects (things), networks (the links between things) and systems (the people and decisions that are enabled by networks). All three are linked. If we understand all of one, we will understand some of the other. Things – equipment, entities, objects – are immediately evident and can be mapped to understand the whole.  

We could call this approach ‘object-based intelligence’. Focusing on the ‘object’ allows us to isolate it and ask specific questions about it – including emissions, signatures, performance, numbers and type, and affiliated location and position information. 

Object-based OSINT allows us to formulate the problem we are trying to solve and the questions we are trying to answer. It exists purely to describe something and assess its capabilities. Once we have characterised enough objects we can start to understand a sample or small part of intention by looking at previous trends, analysing and disaggregating historical data points, and developing questions based on what we know of the object.  

Instead of a linear approach to understanding intent such as asking one question, an object-based approach using OSINT establishes multiple questions and continues to develop new questions, which form a network of attributes around an object. The complexity of an object is reduced, and the problem is broken into smaller constituent parts. Some of these smaller components may only be answerable via direct acquisition of a piece of equipment or through classified means. But object-based OSINT establishes a framework for knowing through description and assessment of capability. 

As the investigation around the cause of the crash of MH-17 progressed, significant object-based intelligence began to be reported in the media through the work of professional journalists and technical analysts. The reporting was supplemented by the release of information from the Dutch Safety Board’s technical enquiry and documents from the joint investigation team.  

The facts were compelling – shrapnel at the crash site that could only have come from the 9N314 missile launched by the Buk-M1, and fragmentation patterns observed on the fuselage could only have been from a specific warhead. Narrowing down the weapon type meant the launch area could be defined. Within that area, possible launch sites were identified.  

The location of the object and its visual signature then became relevant – it could only have come from the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, garrisoned in Kursk close to the Ukrainian border. The Kremlin tried to hide intent by lying on a massive scale and conducting what MI6 described as a ‘hugely intensive, multichannel propaganda effort’, but this was ultimately unsuccessful. The analysis of capabilities clearly revealed what had happened. 

CONCLUSION 

When it comes to predictive intelligence, trying to understand a target’s intentions and develop our expectations of their behaviour is expensive, difficult, and often wrong. It is trying to predict the future – an endeavour in which humans are notoriously ineffective.  

To reduce the risk of surprise and focus intelligence efforts on specific and answerable outcomes, capabilities intelligence provides a framework for knowing. This framework focuses on objects and provides an inbuilt flexibility to define the relationships between objects. But it uses the object as the start point of analysis. While multiple intelligence disciplines can provide inputs to this analysis, it is open source that should be the start point for building capabilities intelligence. 

Dougal Robertson is an executive analyst at Felix Defence, with 13 years’ experience as a military intelligence officer. He has worked in tactical, operational and strategic commands and deployed with the ADF to multiple locations.  

He is a graduate of the RAAF Fighter Intelligence Instructor Course and holds Masters degrees in International Relations and Intelligence & Counter-terrorism. 

The Loyal Wingman concept has taken a significant step forward following recent technology demonstrations at Patuxent River.

Boeing and the US Navy have announced the successful demonstration of two autonomously controlled EA-18G Growlers during the Navy Warfare Development Command’s annual Fleet Experiment (FLEX).

The experiment involved the Growlers acting as unmanned systems under the control of a third Growler to prove the effectiveness of F/A-18 Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler aircrew to remotely control fighter and attack platforms from the cockpit.

According to Tom Brandt, the Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) demonstration lead at Boeing, “This demonstration allows Boeing and the Navy the opportunity to analyze the data collected and decide where to make investments in future technologies.”

The demonstration involved twenty one missions in four sorties.  Brandt went on to say “This technology allows the Navy to extend the reach of sensors while keeping manned aircraft out of harm’s way.”

This is an interesting development for the Royal Australian Air Force and its Super Hornet and Growler fleets, with Brandt describing the capability as “… a force multiplier that enables a single aircrew to control multiple aircraft without greatly increasing workload. It has the potential to increase survivability as well as situational awareness.”

Boeing Australia is rapidly evolving its autonomous systems technology and is preparing for the first flight of its Loyal Wingman prototype later this year.

PMA-290, the Program Office for the P-8A Poseidon at US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), has made an approach to industry for the integration of the AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and other advanced weapon systems into a test aircraft. 

The LRASM is a long range, precision-guided anti-ship missile armed with a penetrator and blast fragmentation warhead for day or night, all weather conditions. The missile employs a multi-modal sensor suite, weapon data link, and enhanced digital anti-jam Global Positioning System to aid target discrimination in congested waters.

Open sources indicate it has a range in excess of 200 nautical miles and has been successfully integrated on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and USAF B-1B Lancer.

The NAVAIR solicitation also includes the potential for integration of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) variants, Mk62/63/65 mines, Small Diameter Bomb (SDB-II), Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD), Bomb Rack Unit BRU-55, and the Universal Armament Interface (UAI).

NAVAIR indicated the integration work will commence in early 2021 and continue for five years; however, this is likely to be the beginning of an extensive series of enhancements to the P-8A as its mission-set expands to meet a more complex and sophisticated maritime threat.

As previously reported in ADBR, the RAAF has taken delivery of the last of its current order for 12 Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft.  The aircraft was delivered to RAAF Edinburgh on December 12, just three years after the first P-8A arrived in-country in November 2016. The 12 P-8As were ordered in three batches each of four aircraft, and Australia retains options for an additional three P-8As which are yet to be confirmed.

The RAAF P-8 was successfully acquired by the Commonwealth via a Co-operative Program with the US Navy rather than a traditional Foreign Military Sale (FMS). 

Queensland start-up land target manufacturer GaardTech has secured its first overseas export order, with a live-fire trial with the UK MoD.

The trail will see GaardTech’s entire range of 2D and 3D, fixed and mobile targets put to the test against the UK’s surface and air-launched weapons systems in day and night, and in fixed and mobile scenarios.

Founded by former Australian Army tanker Steen Bisgaard, GaardTech manufactures high-fidelity steel targets that can be shipped as flat packs. When assembled, they resemble full-scale adversary armoured vehicles, surface to air missile systems, or other land-based high value targets, and can be driven across open ground using a long-range remote controlled robotic system.

These target can be fitted with thermal or electromagnetic signature enhancers which further improves their fidelity to EO-IR sensors at night or through smoke.

The thermal signatures are produced by the company’s patented active thermal cells, while the electronic warfare elements can emulate 4G, 3G, GSM, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, VHF, UHF, and passive radar signatures.

And because of their simple and near-hollow construction, they can withstand multiple high calibre hits and are able to be patched and repairable.

From this trial, the UK Army will be introduced to multiple new training methods which all translate directly into an increase in system lethality and combat readiness.

Lockheed Martin Australia has launched a new bursary with funding of up to $120,000 for tertiary study in a science, technology, engineering or mathematics (STEM) or related field.

This is part of the Gallipoli Scholarship Fund (GSF), a not-for-profit established in 1996 to provide scholarships to eligible descendants of Australian veterans to undertake tertiary study.

The GSF aims to honour the memory and legacy of Australian veterans, and the Lockheed Martin Australia Bursary is the GSF’s first corporate bursary.

There will be one LMA Bursary awarded for 2020, with a further 11 awarded up to the end 2023. 

Applications for the 2020 Bursary close on the March 1, with the recipient of the first Bursary announced at an event on April 16.

Joe North, Chief Executive of Lockheed Martin Australia and New Zealand, said the company was proud to have long-standing relationships with not-for-profit organisations.

“We are very pleased to partner with the Gallipoli Scholarship Fund to launch the first ever Lockheed Martin Australia Bursary, honouring the legacy of our Armed Forces and the service of our veterans,” he said

“Our investment in veteran support organisations as well as Science, Technology, Engineering and Maths-focused initiatives create opportunities for thousands of Australians to enjoy a better future.”

Chair of the Gallipoli Scholarship Fund, retired Major General Michael Smith, said they pleased to have secured this first corporate Bursary with Lockheed Martin Australia.

“It allows the Fund to support more descendants of our Veterans,” he said.

Governor General David Hurley, the former Chief of the Defence Force, and Mrs Linda Hurley have been selected as the first patrons of the Gallipoli Scholarship Fund.

“Linda and I are delighted to be Patrons of the Gallipoli Scholarship Fund,” he said.

“The fund – and its supporters – help young Australians pursue further study, opening up a lifetime of possibilities for the scholars. In shaping the future, the Fund also ensures the past is not forgotten and that the sacrifice of those who have served our nation is not forgotten.”

Further details of the scholarships can be found at https://www.gallipolischolarship.com.au/14

By Staff Writers

This article appeared in the November-December 2019 issue of ADBR.

Tech Brief: Data Link 101

Whilst there has been a number of public calls of late to reconsider the contents of the 2016 Defence White Paper, one constant in any new iteration will be the ongoing need to invest in the integrating technologies of the joint force, in particular, tactical data links.      

Developing a sovereign defence and industry data link capability will deliver significant benefits to the ADF as there is more to them than simply the ‘black boxes’.  Defence requires a deep understanding of the various types of data links and their limitations, and this knowledge needs to span both the engineering and operational communities.

In short, the management and integration of Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance & Electronic Warfare (ISREW) systems along with both current and emerging communications technology, is key in allowing the ADF to deliver effects greater than the sum of its constituent parts and meet the challenges posed by contemporary threats and next generation technologies.

Furthermore, whilst recognising the need for interoperability across the joint force, it is also essential that the ADF remains fully interoperable with our closest ally, the United States (US). However, the aspiration to become fully interoperable is in many ways becoming more difficult to achieve. This is due to the complexities involved within many of these systems and the limitations of the TDL itself.

Joint Data Network

The ADF has already made significant progress in the establishment of a Joint Data Network (JDN) to enable many of these systems and technologies to work cohesively together and deliver force level effects.

The JDN is a network of communications and electronics systems that carry Tactical Data Link (TDL), multi-sensor early warning information, and intelligence data to support joint force operations. The primary contributors to the JDN are from data derived from Multi-TDL Networks (MTN), through to intelligence networks such as the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS).

What is a TDL?

So what is a TDL, why does the ADF need them, and how do TDLs enable the ADF to meet the operational narratives which demand high levels of integration and interoperability.  To provide a foundational understanding we will consider the two main TDL that the ADF currently employs, those being Link 11 and Link 16 which form the largest part of the Multi-TDL Network.

Simply put, a data link is a means of connecting one location to another for the purpose of transmitting and receiving data. This data can be described in terms of it enabling situational awareness, integrated fire control, and command and control capabilities. US military documentation on TDL goes further and defines a data link as being characterised by its standardised message formats and transmission characteristics.

To make this exchange of data tactically relevant it must be exchanged in real-time, which in practicality means within 20 seconds. However, there are a variety of TDL each with their own standardised message formats and transmission characteristics, all of which have their own strengths and weaknesses.

Link 11

Link 11 is considered a legacy data link that exchanges air, surface and subsurface data between ground, airborne and maritime platforms over High Frequency (HF) and Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) media paths. The reason it is described as a legacy data link is because it only uses the M-Series message format, which is not part of the J-Series family of messages; this family includes J-Series, F & FJ-Series, K-Series, as well as the common message format.

Link 11 uses a netted architecture in which all Participating Units (PU) exchange data with each other through a protocol known as polling.  One PU in the net is designated as Data Net Control Station (DNCS) and during normal operating procedure of Roll Call, the DNCS sends an addressed ‘transmit now’ message to each net participant in turn. Once all PU have transmitted their data the DNCS transmits its data and the net cycle begins again.  

However, the time it takes for a net cycle may be too long with the result being that data becomes stale and un-useable for tactical operations. Added to that, the DNCS is a central point of failure and Link 11 data rates are notably poor. Careful management of the units which will participate in the roll call is always considered based upon the individual capabilities of a platform and the operational demands in place.

Another weakness of Link 11 is its limited resistance to electronic counter measures as it operates on a single frequency, which can be easy to detect and as a consequence is very easy to jam or spoof through net capture.

Nonetheless, Link 11 does have its strengths and none more so than its capacity to operate Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) when utilising the HF media path. Considering contemporary operations are conducted at increasingly greater ranges from Australia and the prospect of operating within a satellite denied environment is also becoming more likely, the use of any TDL that provides for a BLOS capability is invaluable for early warning.

Link 22

By 2025 the ADF will have migrated from Link 11 to Link 22 which utilises the same media paths. The use of HF will continue to support the exchange of data beyond line of sight in a satellite denied environment.

Link 22 has many advantages over Link 11 and indeed Link 16, but it is in regard to its efficiency that Link 22 has its greatest strength. The introduction of F-Series messages and the improved quality of service features used during every transmission are the main improvements, and since Link 22 and Link 16 message standards are part of the J-Series family, the exchange of data is easier to achieve when platforms operate in a Multi-TDL Network scenario.

Link 16

Link 16 is both the ADFs and US Department of Defence’s primary TDL and is essential in enabling secure situational awareness, integrated fire control, and command and control capabilities to platforms. In order to maintain interoperability with our closest ally the ADF must continue to expand and modernise its Link 16 capability in line with that of the US.

But to begin exploring Link 16 we must first understand the differences in the widely and often over-used and mis-understood terms surrounding this capability and in particular – JTIDS, MIDS, and Link 16.

JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) and MIDS (Multifunctional Information Distribution System) are bearer systems commonly referred to as terminals or radios that exchange J-Series messages.

Strictly speaking the term Link 16 is the J-Series message catalogue or the language of the JTIDS/MIDS terminal. That said, irrespective of the terminal being employed or the data being exchanged, it is all generally referred to as Link 16.

Link 16 is a secure, jam resistant, high capacity data link that uses spread-spectrum, frequency-hopping and error detection and correction techniques to exchange data between a variety of platforms. Developed to overcome many of the weaknesses of Link 11, it operates on a time division principle known as Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA). 

TDMA divides time into cycles, the most significant of which is a 12 second cycle known as a frame. Within the frame, time is then sub-divided into time slots and allocated within the network design process for users to transmit data. Link 16 has up to 128 possible frequency-hopping patterns (FHP) that could be employed and this is based upon the Link 16 network design and transmission security protocols (cryptographic keys.  Therefore, it is crucial that users are aligned to the right FHP and are using the directed cryptographic key at the right time, in order to successfully exchange data.

The fundamental weakness of Link 16 is that it operates on UHF and as such is limited to line of sight. To overcome this disadvantage Link 16 can be exchanged beyond line of sight through satellite, notably the Joint Range Extension Application Protocol (JREAP). 

LINK 16 modernisation imperatives

The major challenge for Link 16 users worldwide today is how to meet the US mandate to modernise Link 16. The main purpose of the modernisation is to overcome the threat posed to the operational use of Link 16 by implementing cryptographic modernisation.

Additional advanced capabilities, such as enhanced throughput and concurrent multi-netting, allow users to transmit and receive more data and thus provide greater flexibility by increasing the capacity on already congested Link 16 networks.

Of real concern, is that some nations and platforms may be quicker to implement these advanced capabilities and demand their use way ahead of others, with the consequence being a trade-off between capability versus interoperability. Considering the reliance on Link 16 by many platforms, in which case one could assume that capability would almost certainly come at the expense of interoperability.

The expansion of software defined radios that can employ Link 16, such as MIDS-Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and small form factor radios to replace the ageing JTIDS & MIDS terminals, only continues to complicate the ADF’s desire to maintain a minimum level of interoperability. To compound this even further, with the exception of cryptographic modernisation, there are substantial differences in the modernisation features that each terminal may or can integrate.

New Generation TDL

The introduction of new platforms like the F-35A Lightning II to the Royal Australian Air Force, whilst capable of using Link 16, it does not use what could be described as a conventional Link 16 terminal. Instead it is equipped with a software defined radio: the Northrop Grumman Communications, Navigation and Identification system. The platform is also fitted with its own data link, the Multifunction Advanced Data Link known as MADL.

With the advent of new software defined radios comes other advancements such as the ability to exchange data via advanced waveforms. Some MIDS-JTRS radios are equipped with Tactical Targeting Network Technology or TTNT for short.  TTNT provides the user with an easy join, low latency, high-throughput IP network capable of exchanging all types of data.

Certainly, the advantage of high-throughput data exchange would be welcomed by many tactical Link 16 users. For example, the capacity to exchange real-time video to support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms is simply not achievable via Link 16 or indeed Link 11 or 22. Naturally, information on how it is actually being used is scarce outside of US operational units, but what is known is that technologies like TTNT will undoubtedly transform how data is exchanged across the battlespace.

Ultimately, irrespective of the technology employed, the ADF must remain interoperable with its closest ally wherever possible and data links will continue to play a key role. However, only by carefully managing these technologies will the ADF enable an effective JDN and maintain this level of interoperability.  This will require a deep understanding of the technologies involved both from an engineering point of view as well as the operational application.

It will certainly require a deep seated knowledge of TDL across Australia defence and industry.

This article appeared in the November-December 2019 issue of ADBR.

In 2016 the ADF Defence White Paper and associated Integrated Investment Plan (IIP) identified that greater emphasis will be placed on the joint force, bringing together different capabilities so the ADF can apply more force more rapidly and more effectively when required. 

Correctly managing and integrating Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance & Electronic Warfare (ISREW) systems along with both current and emerging communications technology is key in allowing the ADF to deliver that force to meet and overcome the challenges of the 21st century. 

To meet this challenge, the movement toward an ADF Joint Data Network (JDN) to enable many of these systems and technologies to work cohesively together is already underway. The JDN is a network of communications and electronics systems that carry Tactical Data Link (TDL), multi-sensor early warning information, and intelligence data to support joint force operations. Views vary on what is the primary contributor to enabling the JDN, from data derived from Multi-TDL Networks (MTN), through to intelligence networks such as the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS).  

Head of Force Design in Australian Defence Force Headquarters and previously Air Commander Australia, Air Vice-Marshal Steve Roberton has provided an insight into the importance of Indigenous heritage in the development of a networked, fifth-generation force.

In an interview published on the Department of Defence website the Air Marshal said, “We want to become a fifth-generation force that’s far more than just really cool airplanes and high-tech wizardry,” and further acknowledged “We can’t do that without having a group representative of first Australians.”

Air Vice-Marshal Roberton will play a senior role in a network supporting the RAAF’s Indigenous Liaison Officers which first started at RAAF Base Williamtown in 2014 when he was Commander Air Combat Group.

“For the next 10 years, the network will support the Chief of Air Force’s recently launched Indigenous strategy ‘Our Place, Our Skies’ and ‘Common Ground’ action plan, with champions changing every two years”, he said.

Preparing the Air Force and indeed the wider Australian Defence Force for increasingly complex and integrated operations will require ongoing access to vast training areas, airspace and ranges. This might potentially lead to a more extensive network of bases over the next decade with Indigenous and heritage factors coming into play on a number of levels.

From a security point of view, the development of Australia’s defence infrastructure and ranges is also likely to attract unwanted interest from third parties, with Indigenous communities able to provide a unique insight into local changes in the environment or human behaviour. 

The establishment of an Indigenous heritage network complements broader Defence efforts to build the technical networks required to enable fifth generation operations. Air Vice-Marshal Roberton’s comments provide a nuanced and sophisticated insight into the importance of developing the human networks necessary to meet national security objectives.           

With major defence procurement projects now under way, the Government says it will hold defence primes 100 per cent responsible for achieving maximum Australian industry content (AIC).

Defence Industry Minister Melissa Price said she wanted to ensure the Defence Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) possessed the people with commercial and private sector experience to guide defence procurement at this vital stage.

The government’s investment in defence capability had brought countless opportunities for Australian industry, she said.

“But we need to go even further in our support for small business,” she said in a video message to the ADM congress in Canberra.

“As we enter the delivery phase of these major projects I am 100 per cent focused on holding the primes to account on their obligations. That’s why I have directed Defence to establish an independent AIC audit program.”

“It will investigate and report on whether major contractors are meeting their AIC obligations. I know this is a primary concern to all of you in defence industry and I have heard you loud and clear.”

Ms Price said she thought we were doing a good job but could do better.

CASG head Tony Fraser said AIC was clearly a government priority and it was also a CASG priority.

“We have appointed an individual to lead AIC…..and reporting direct to me and I will assign him the Smart Buyer process and the Smart Buyer team as well as the independent assurance team,” he said.

“That way will drive in AIC at that highest level early on in the acquisition strategies, input into the capability management steering groups and considerations, the gate reviews as we develop our work.”

Navy Chief Vice Admiral Michael Noonan said he was committed to AIC but was in no position to mandate AIC levels.

“I don’t think it is particularly helpful personally to be mandating a specified percentage of AIC in any particular program but I think the commitment to striving to have the greatest possible amount of Australian industry content in the design, the build, the sustainment and the operation of each and every one of our platforms is absolutely inherently what we should be doing,” he said.

But there were aspects of naval capability which simply could not be made in Australia, he said, citing the combat system of Collins and Attack class submarines.

That would change as the shipbuilding program proceeded.

“What I expect to see as part of the commitment to continuous shipbuilding is some of those things we are currently sourcing overseas will eventually be built on shore. It makes great sense,” he said.

By John Conway 

This article appeared in the May-June 2019 issue of ADBR

Access and basing – and logistics writ large – is back in the spotlight in the Indo-Pacific, and beyond   

In 2018 the Australian Government’s 2018 announced a partnership with the US to develop the Lombrum naval base on Manus Island. More recently, it added plans to upgrade the Cocos Islands airport with a wider runway and taxiway, and strengthened parking aprons.  

Both of these developments send a strong message about the importance of logistics in setting Australian Defence Force posture in the broader region.   

Elsewhere, the UK MoD recently completed its first overseas deployment of six F-35B Lightning II aircraft to its largest overseas base at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus. Although it started out as a training exercise, it soon expanded to include combat operations over Syria, this deployment highlighting the critical importance of infrastructure and logistics in accelerating the integration and projection of power and influence. 

While major platform acquisitions invariably steal the limelight, the mounting interest in operational access and basing, and the US’s and the Commonwealth’s increased focus on the readiness and sustainment of high intensity operations in the Indo-Pacific region, marks a significant change in the force posture which has characterised recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.   

With economists calling for broader investment in Australia’s infrastructure to stimulate the economy, they should look no further than national security objectives as a priority.    

The Sir Richard Williams Foundation High Intensity Operations and Sustaining Self-Reliance seminar in April 2019 broke new ground with a shift in focus from the design and generation of a 5th generation force to the practical aspects of its application and sustainment.  The seminar examined the challenges in preparing and posturing the Defence Force for a future which is fundamentally unknowable, and the impact of policy on the way we think and prepare. 

In his opening, Professor Brendan Sargant analysed trends from recent White Papers and the wistful nature of the pursuit for a rules-based order, while Dr Andrew Carr unpacked Defence self-reliance in the context of Australian foreign policy, and Dr Alan Stephens analysed self-reliance and its inextricable link to military strategy.   

Each looked to the future with a nod to the past, holding a mirror to extant policy and thinking, and painting the picture of a defence force that must now further embrace industry and become increasingly prepared to take the lead and become ever more self-reliant. And operate at higher tempos, too.      

The lasting message was that policy was in a state of flux and likely to remain so, with the impact on Defence becoming clear in that it must now think in terms of what it might be required to do rather knowing with certainty what it will be going to do.    

With an emphasis on preparedness and building sovereign capability, the seminar highlighted the importance of establishing favourable policy settings for the operational architecture and apparatus of a sophisticated manoeuvre capability in the Indo-Pacific region, which will go beyond the major systems which have dominated the defence narrative for the past decade.   

Above all, it highlighted the criticality of access and basing, and a renewed emphasis on logistics as an essential element of defence preparedness, and the prerequisite for future operational success.             

ACCESS ALL AREAS  

The past two decades have largely seen the ADF contributing force elements to US-led coalitions in support of operations with a reasonably well-defined scope in terms of missions and tasks. These tasks were extremely dangerous and difficult, and way beyond the capability of most defence forces. Whether or not they had clearly defined linkages to geostrategic objectives is another matter but, without doubt, the ADF acted professionally and further established a reputation for operational excellence. 

Much of the architecture and apparatus for operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan was put in place by the US with support from others. Basing, commodities, and contracted services were provided by gulf state host nations, with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar in particular providing safe and secure facilities from which the coalition projected overwhelming firepower.   

But the Williams seminar described a different future, with Defence refocusing on the Indo-Pacific theatre and its new power projection challenges, not least in relation to secure and resilient access and basing. Providing the architecture and apparatus for the operational level in the region will require increasing levels of influence and investment, just at a time when China and others are trying to do the same.   

And it’s not just physical access. In most cases the ADF will also have to gain access to the information domain and, more specifically, potentially fight for access to the electromagnetic spectrum with commercial actors just as hungry for the spectrum as the military.  

Therefore, in many ways it could be argued that from an organisational perspective, operations in the Middle East skipped a level – the operational level, where the so-called ‘operational’ art of linking strategic objectives with tactical actions through the design, organisation, synchronisation, and command and control of operations and campaigns is practised.   

OPERATIONAL ART  

Operational art is fundamentally a form of communication with its intent to send a message to both friend and foe. It is described in human-centric terms, such as imagination, skill, talent, influence and, above all, ideas, measured in terms of the power, influence and impact they create. Logistics, for example, is fundamentally characterised as being operational art.    

Yet many defence forces instinctively prefer to deal in the more tangible aspects of operational science and combat systems, even though future concepts and doctrine describe an increasingly important role for combat support and combat service support systems. Such is the nature of Defence resourcing and acquisition that operational art is more often than not in lag of the science, and focused on the application of force at an individual combat system, or project level.   

Indeed, doctrine does not help either with its somewhat scientific and business-school description which lacks important detail and nuance: ‘Operational art links available resources (means) and tactical actions (ways) to the attainment of national and military strategic end states and objectives (ends), while taking into account possible costs (risk)’.   

Although this description is technically correct, the new operational environment which is characterised by long-term strategic competition across multiple domains, renders such definitions inadequate and in need of a significant refresh if it is to generate the thinking necessary to counter new threats and new risks. 

Since the end of the Cold War most coalition operations have been dominated by science and management rather than operational art, especially so in the past decade, despite a broader move away from the overly scientific approach to operational planning seen in the Vietnam War era.   

A key factor for many defence forces has been the harsh reality of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) which sent shockwaves across western economies and resulted in many forces being substantially configured for efficiency rather than effectiveness. And while the first order impact of the GFC on the ADF was limited, the US and the UK were not so lucky, with project cancellations and underinvestment in combat-enablers allowing strategic competitors to rapidly close the capability gap.    

Ideally, operational art should lead the defence investment debate and be free-thinking and imaginative, open to criticism, contextualised historically, and its aesthetic dimension representing the character of the society from which the defence force is drawn.   

Of course, this must be set within the constraints of an affordable defence budget and the physical building blocks of the force structure. But simply linking strategy to projects and systems, rather than mission objectives is unlikely to guarantee operational success.  

History has proven, time and again, that operational success has been as much about ideas and institutions, such as bases and logistics facilities, as it was the force structure itself. The most likely missions and tasks the ADF will conduct in the Indo-Pacific region in the future will require a similar focus on the operational architecture and apparatus necessary to enable the manoeuvre of a networked, 5th generation force.   

OPERATIONAL APPARATUS 

There is nothing new in recognising the importance of basing and logistics and their relationship with operational success. But the Williams seminar explored the art of logistics in a modern context, and highlighted the practical elements of projecting and sustaining a digitally networked, joint force, and the need to incentivise defence industry to become part of the solution too. 

Presentations by Donna Cain-Riva, LTCOL David Beaumont, LTCOL Keirin Joyce, and WGCDR Alison McCarthy demonstrated the importance of professional mastery and intellectual rigour in the way readiness and sustainment challenges must be addressed as an enterprise when integrating the tactical edge of ADF warfighting capability with the national support base. They described the apparatus necessary to support an agile and technically sophisticated joint force that has a growing dependence on digital supply chains.  

The assurance of these supply chains must also be set within the context of a secure and resilient basing strategy.  Protecting and operating bases in the broader region will place an increased demand on resources and will need to consider whether the contracted logistics and support services upon which many platforms rely are able to deploy and sustain operations when threat levels are elevated.   

And while the presenters validated the importance of the enabling capabilities described in detail in the 2016 Defence White Paper, they also revealed much is still to be done and investment to be made in major force-multiplying logistics projects. This will be challenging since logistics cannot be bought off-the-shelf like many major weapon systems, and it is often oversimplified to focus on supplies. Yet basing provides the platform upon which sophisticated and resilient logistics capability can be built, and firepower delivered.    

Furthermore, by using the term ‘enabling capabilities’, it can relegate them to a supporting role which inevitably translates into under-investment when budget pressures impact priorities and the competition for resources.   

But without these enablers the joint force is constrained significantly no matter how impressive the line-up of combat systems. The consequence of this is to limit the operational options and choices available to the Government of the day, and thereby handing a strategic advantage to a competitor.        

The unfolding geo-strategic circumstances are such that yesterday’s enablers are becoming tomorrow’s battle winners.  

LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION  

Operational apparatus – described in terms of critical infrastructure (bases, ranges, ports and airfields), information and communications technology (ICT), logistics support, science and technology, and health services – must be designed at an enterprise level rather than within individual projects. 

The benefits of designing and building enabling capabilities at an enterprise level was exemplified in Wohlstetter’s Strategic Air Base Study, conducted on behalf of the RAND Corporation in 1954. The study examined the key factors in the selection of US bomber bases, which included, among others, distances to targets, favourable access points into enemy defences, logistics and the supply chains. 

In his report into the Analytical Criteria for Judgements, Decisions, and Assessments, Barry Watts, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) from 2002 to 2014, points out that Wohlstetter’s study “not only resulted in a more secure posture for Strategic Air Command’s bomber force, but also saved the Air Force a billion dollars in planned construction costs for overseas bases”.  

Watts describes the success of the study as being down to its focus on the operational art of where and how the bases would be used as part of a broader strategic system, rather than the science of simply working out how to acquire, construct, and maintain them. This exemplifies the importance of considering the asymmetries of the battlespace in a net assessment approach to competition, rather than tactical platform-on-platform engagements.       

Throughout history, access and basing and, more recently overflight rights, have played a significant role in the projection of military power, with the strategic significance of many of those factors enduring to this day. The most successful long-term basing locations have been those which have proven to be secure, resilient, flexible and adaptable and, moreover, available to operate within a broader strategic and operational enterprise, not just in support of local tactical activity.  

While individual types of bases are described doctrinally in terms of their location, permanency, and facilities, the most effective bases are those which maintain asymmetric and strategic relevance over time, and provide a range of options across the full spectrum of operations.   

FORCE PROJECTION 

Looking further afield, RAF Akrotiri on the Island of Cyprus is an interesting case in point.   

Cyprus has throughout history maintained its geostrategic relevance with numerous rulers recognising and exploiting its significance. At one point it was gifted to Queen Cleopatra of Egypt by the Roman General Mark Antony. Later, Richard the Lionheart used it to mount crusades before selling the island to the Knights Templar for 100,000 gold bezants.   

More recent times saw the Republic of Cyprus forming in 1960 under the treaty of independence wherein the British retained control of the military bases and installations, which remain operational to this day.   

Described formally as a Permanent Joint Operating Base (PJOB), Akrotiri serves as a multi-purpose enabler for operations in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East theatres, and beyond. It has been used by the UK and its allies as a base for operations in Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, and Syria, among others. Indeed, the ADF deployed an RAAF C-130H detachment to Akrotiri in 2006 as part of Operation RAMP to support the DFAT-led evacuation of Australian personnel from the war in Lebanon.    

Much of Akrotiri’s success has been down to its functionality as a forward mounting base (FMB), one which delivers capability within the theatre of operations but far enough away from the combat area to allow the storage and maintenance of weapons and munitions, vehicles, role equipment, and fuel supplies without the levels of security required in forward operating bases.   

A key function of an FMB is to enable and accelerate the integration of the joint force before forward deployment to main operating bases, and to carry out those logistics activities that are too difficult to undertake at a busy forward operating location.   

In other words, it provides a stepping-stone at the operational level for individual force elements to accumulate the fighting power required in the combat area; fighting power measured in terms of both operational art and science.   

The recent deployment of the six RAF F-35Bs to Cyprus, and the acceleration of their integration into combat operations over Syria provides further evidence to support the development of the architecture and apparatus of a networked 5th generation force in the Indo-Pacific. New or re-developed basing can hold extensive fuel reserves, weapons, and pre-positioned equipment for future deployments, thereby reducing the demand for air and sealift just at the time when it is needed the most. 

The development of basing on Manus Island, Cocos Island, as has been reported recently in the Northern Territory, and elsewhere represents a significant opportunity to enhance the preparedness and resilience of the ADF and forward-deployed US forces. Combined with an appropriate ongoing investment in training ranges and logistics capability, the Commonwealth can leverage Australia’s enduring geo-strategic advantage, and negate the need for other highly-specialised and resource-intensive force structure drivers such as aircraft carriers.   

Adaptable, secure and resilient bases provide operational access, and their inherent logistics capability links strategy to task. They link force structure to accelerated warfare, and resources with strategic outcomes.   

A network of strategically located bases are the foundations of a sophisticated 5th generation manoeuvre capability, and provide increased choice and options when the time comes to project firepower and influence. 

The RAAF’s planned acquisition of six Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton unmanned high-altitude long-endurance maritime ISR systems is potentially at risk due to the reallocation of programmed US Navy production funding, and reported delays in the development of the planned integrated functional capability (IFC) 4.0 version of the aircraft.

Originally approved through a Gate 1 process in 2014, Triton was selected under Project AIR 7000 Phase 1B to complement the RAAF’s planned 12-15 AIR 7000 Phase 2 Boeing P-8A Poseidons to conduct long-range surveillance of Australia’s maritime approaches. The RAAF’s planned manned-unmanned maritime surveillance model closely matches that planned for the US Navy, which currently has programs of record for 132 P-8As and 68 MQ-4Cs, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale.

The RAAF is acquiring the Triton through a A$200 million development, production and sustainment cooperative program with the US Navy which gives the RAAF input into system and sensor operating modes and development. To this end, at least eight RAAF and Australian Defence personnel are embedded within the US Navy’s Triton project office at NAS Patuxent (Pax) River near Washington DC to work on the aircraft’s development.

But the new uncertainty follows the draft FY2021 President’s Budget which shows the Pentagon’s Department of Navy has allocated no funding to Triton production Lots 6 and 7 in FY 2021 and FY 2022, after just 14 of the planned 68 US Navy Tritons will have been delivered.

Indeed, ADBR understands that the planned US$400m from these two years of the programmed Triton Lot 6 and Lot 7 production funding will be diverted elsewhere, with about half of it to bolster IFC4 development, and the balance to be part of the Pentagon’s contribution to building President Trump’s border wall. With elements within Congress pushing back against the stripping of DoD funding for the border wall, the budget isn’t expected to be signed off anytime soon, adding further uncertainty to production planning.

On top of the baseline IFC3 configuration currently in service, the US Navy has already contracted Northrop Grumman for more than US$80m for IFC4 development through four separate awards since July 2018. But that development is reportedly lagging and requires additional funding.

The IFC4 configuration is planned to incorporate the Northrop Grumman-developed ‘multi-intelligence’ (MULTI-INT) package which will incorporate signals (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) capabilities more advanced than the US Navy’s current Lockheed EP-3E Aries version of the P-3 Orion. IFC4 is considered by the RAAF to be its required baseline configuration, as is the incorporation of automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) which ADBR understands is also at risk of delays.

In conjunction with the Triton’s maritime AN/ZPY-3 multi-function active sensor (MFAS) radar and multi-spectral targeting system-B (MTS-B) electro-optic/infrared (EO/IR) sensors and satellite communication (SATCOM), MULTI-INT will give the system an incredibly capable real-time, high-altitude maritime surveillance capability across multiple spectrums.

The diversion or deferral of US Navy Lot 6 and 7 production funding means RAAF Tritons planned for manufacture in these lots will be more expensive due to reduced production numbers.

The RAAF has reportedly been asked to take the US Navy’s deferred Lot 6 and 7 production slots, but this will likely add additional cost to the RAAF’s program as these aircraft are planned to be produced at a lower rate than later production lots.

Coupled with delays to the MULTI-INT development, this could mean early RAAF Tritons might also require a later hardware or software retrofit, adding further cost to, and reducing capability from, the RAAF’s planned schedule.

As a consequence, Defence’s CASG and the RAAF have reportedly been asked to submit three options to the Defence Investment Committee (IC) in early March on how to proceed on the program: to take the US Navy production slots and incur higher costs; to delay the program by an estimated two years until IFC4 is operationally proven and production ramps up; or to abandon the Triton program altogether. Regardless of which option is recommended by the IC, this will either require additional funding and/or approval by the National Security Committee of Cabinet.

If the decision is taken to abandon the program, the RAAF might have to consider alternative capabilities such as additional manned P-8As, MC-55A Peregrine ISR aircraft, or perhaps a maritime ISR version of the unmanned General Atomics Sky Guardian that will be introduced under Project AIR 7003.

The IFC4 delay adds to other Triton program schedule delays, including the planned early operational capability (EOC) of two Tritons on the island of Guam. Originally scheduled for early 2018, the Guam deployment was subsequently delayed to late 2018 and then late 2019, but didn’t actually occur until January 2020.

Vires Acquirit Eundo – Strength by Going 

By Max Blenkin & Andrew McLaughlin 

This article appeared in the Nov-Dec 2019 issue of ADBR

The last of the Royal Australian Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry/Adelaide class guided missile frigates, HMAS Melbourne was paid off at a ceremony at Sydney’s Garden Island Naval Base on October 26. 

The ceremony was conducted after the vessel returned from her final cruise, a circumnavigation of Australia, on September 27. 

As with the retirement of any vessel of distinguished service, this was an occasion of some sadness for her past and current crew. “It’s like having 200 deaths in your family, simultaneously,” Melbourne’s 18th and last commanding officer, CMDR Marcus Buttler said in a statement. “It’s an amazing experience, I’m really proud of these guys. 

“There are thousands of people who have called this ship home over the past 27 years and most of our people don’t know a time in the Navy without HMAS Melbourne and the FFGs in the Fleet,” CMDR Buttler said. “I am so proud of the men and women of HMAS Melbourne for sustaining a high tempo at sea right to the end and contributing to her outstanding legacy.” 

“It is also a sad day as we see the end of almost forty years of the Adelaide class frigate which has been one of the most effective maritime warfighting platforms ever built,” 

In all, the RAN operated six of the Adelaide class FFGs, in their time Australia’s most capable warships and, with the distinctive sharply raked bow and low-set superstructure, the most recognisable. 

The Perry/Adelaide class FFGs replaced the RAN’s River class destroyer escorts, six of which were built in Australia between 1959 and 1968 and which were based on the UK’s Type 12M Rothesay and 12I Leander class frigates. The FFGs were the first RAN ships to be powered by gas turbines. 

The US-designed Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFGs were initially designed as low capability ships intended to conduct escort and general purpose missions as the lower tier of the of the US Navy’s ‘high-low fleet plan’ to augment that service’s larger Spruance class DDGs.  

Fifty one of the total 71 FFGs constructed served with the US Navy, and while the USN has now replaced them with the Freedom and Independence class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), some continue in service with the Navies of Taiwan, Spain, Greece, Poland and other nations 

The Adelaide class was a derivation of the Perry class, of which. Four of the Australian vessels were built in the US at Todd Pacific Shipyard in Seattle with the first, HMAS Adelaide commissioned in 1980 and retired in 2008 to become a dive wreck. 

The last two vessels, HMAS Newcastle which was decommissioned in July 2019, and HMAS Melbourne were built in Australia at the AMECON yard, now BAE Systems in Williamtown Victoria. HMAS Melbourne (FFG 05) was laid down in July 1985, launched in May 1989 and commissioned in February 1992. In her busy career, she has conducted multiple deployments to the Persian Gulf and Middle East region, as well as to Timor Leste. 

Following the retirement of the RAN’s three Charles F Adams/Perth class guided missile destroyers in 2001, the FFGs served as the principal air warfare warship. Originally equipped with a single Mark 13 missile launcher able to fire the SM-2 missile, four of the six vessels underwent a major upgrade in the 2000s under the four-phased Project SEA 1390 FFG Upgrade Project (FFG-UP). 

The upgrade provided a comprehensive upgrade to their weapons, sensors and combat systems. New weapons included newer RGM-84 Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles and the RIM-66 SM-2 Block IIIA medium-range anti-aircraft missiles employed, plus the challenging installation of the Mk 41 vertical launch system on the forecastle able to employ up to 32 shorter-range Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESSM) anti-air missiles.  

New sensors included an upgrade of the AN/SPS-49v4 air surveillance radar to the AN/SPS-49Av1MPU standard, a new AN/SPS-55 surface search and navigation radar, an upgrade to the Mk92 Fire Control System from MOD 2 to the MOD 12 standard, the addition of a passive Radamec 2500 electro-optical targeting system (EOTS), a multi-sensor Radar Integrated Automatic Detect and Track System (RIADT), and the replacement of the original AN/SQS-56 and MULLOKA sonar systems with the Thompson (Thales) Spherion set common to the then-new ANZAC class frigates. 

But the upgrade was not without its problems, blowing out in cost by nearly 50 per cent and being delayed by four years. The original contract signed in November 1998 called for the sixth vessel to be re-delivered in 2005, but despite the reduction from six to four vessels, the fourth wasn’t accepted into service and SEA 1390 wasn’t removed from the government’s projects of concern list until late 2009. The other two vessels, HMA Ships Canberra and Adelaide were decommissioned in by 2008. 

When Melbourne arrived in Sydney for the last time in September, RAN Fleet Commander, RADM Jonathan Mead, said the ship had given 27 years of distinguished service to Australia’s maritime operations. “HMAS Melbourne deployed on operations across the globe including to the Middle East eight times, earning battle honours for her service in East Timor and the Persian Gulf,” he said. 

“The Adelaide Class guided missile frigates have formed the backbone of our Navy operations for decades and Melbourne has played a vital role, sailing more than 900,000 nautical miles since her commissioning in 1992.” 

CMDR Buttler said Melbourne recently completed a four month deployment through north Asia, including conducting international maritime surveillance operations to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution sanctions against North Korea. 

“HMAS Melbourne has been deployed overseas for most of 2018 and 2019, showing what her Ship’s company of hardworking Navy personnel can do, and although today is bittersweet I am also very proud,” he said. “Thousands of people have called this ship home over the past 27 years with many fond memories of their time aboard and I have no doubt many of them will be sad to see her seagoing service come to a close today.” 

The government has yet to announce the fate of Melbourne and sister ship Newcastle, both of which remain tied up at Garden Island in Sydney. There had been reports that both Poland and Greece were interested in acquiring the vessels, and most recently it was reported a Chilean delegation had visited Sydney to inspect both vessels recently. 

By Andrew McLaughlin 

This article appeared in the Nov-Dec 2019 issue of ADBR.

The Commonwealth announced on November 28 the selection of the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) MQ-9B Sky Guardian as its preferred version of the Predator B to meet the RAAF’s Project AIR 7003 requirement for an armed medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS). 

The Sky Guardian was previously marketed as the Certified Predator-B, and forms the basis of the Protector RG Mk1 system being acquired for the UK’s Royal Air Force. The ADF selected the certified Sky Guardian over the similar GA-ASI MQ-9A Reaper Block 5 model which is common to that currently being acquired by the USAF. 

“Cutting-edge technology of this kind, with advanced sensors and systems, would complement advanced aircraft such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and ensure that the ADF maintains state-of-the-art capability,” Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds said in a statement. 

The Sky Guardian will be certified so that it may operate in controlled airspace, an important capability for remotely piloted vehicles in proximity to civil air traffic. To this end, GA-ASI is developing a ‘detect-and-avoid’ radar for the UK’s Protector program which will also be incorporated onto the Sky Guardian. The Reaper does not have a detect-and-avoid sensor, and is not intended to be certified. 

The long-awaited announcement comes more than a year after the November 2018 Gate 1 announcement for AIR 7003, where the Sky Guardian and the Reaper were shortlisted. The Gate 1 announcement itself came more than two years after Gate 0, and more than 18 months after the originally planned 2017 Avalon Airshow Gate 1 announcement was cancelled at the last moment following intense lobbying and a renewed effort by Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) to pitch its rival Heron TP system. 

No indication of in-service, initial operational capability (IOC) or final operational capability (FOC) timelines were given in the latest announcement, nor was the number of systems to be acquired mentioned. The 2016 Defence White Paper and Integrated Investment Plan (IIP) indicated between 12 and 16 systems would be acquired. 

The IIP also notes that new facilities at the Shoalwater Bay Training Area in Queensland will support the introduction of the armed UAS, while new fixed facilities will be built at RAAF Base Townsville to support the capability. 

ADF air vehicle operators have been training and operating on exchange with USAF operational Reaper units at Creech AFB and Holloman AFB in the US since February 2015. 

The RAAF retired its first unmanned system – the IAI Heron I – in 2017. The RAAF leased three Herons from Canadian company MDA in late 2009 under Project Nankeen to meet an urgent operational requirement to provide surveillance support to Australian and coalition troops in Afghanistan. 

With Australia winding down its presence in Afghanistan in 2014 Defence elected to extend the lease on two Herons for operations in Australia, initially for a further six years at a cost of $120 million. But Defence subsequently negotiated an early cancellation of that lease. 

Between January 2010 and November 2014 RAAF Herons flew over 27,100 hours in support of operations in Afghanistan, while between April 2015 and June 2017 the two Herons based in Australia flew a further 710 hours. The two Australian-based Herons were mostly flown from Woomera in South Australia, but operated from RAAF Base Amberley, and from Rockhampton Airport during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2015. 

Because the Heron I didn’t have a sense-and-avoid sensor, special operating regulations had to be established for the duration of the exercise. To this end, an agreement was signed by the RAAF’s Surveillance and Response Group (SRG) and Airservices Australia to set out procedures for Airservices and the RAAF to work within to allow the Heron to be safely flown in civil airspace without any significant impact on civil air traffic. 

The armed MALE capability will be co-located at RAAF Edinburgh near Adelaide with other key ADF ISR assets such as the P-8A Poseidon, the Project AIR 7000 Phase 1B MQ-4C Triton high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) maritime ISR, the AIR 555 MC-55A Peregrine electronic warfare support aircraft, and the AIR 3503 Distributed Ground Station (DGS-AUS) intelligence unit which is responsible for the analysis of data collected from the various RAAF ISR platforms. 

But while the ground control segment, support and sustainment force, and training facilities will be located at Edinburgh, it is yet to be determined whether the MQ-9B air vehicles will actually be based at Edinburgh or, more likely, at a remote location such as Woomera. 

The ministerial statement said the next phase of the project will ‘focus on developing the MQ-9B acquisition proposal, which is scheduled for government consideration in 2021-22’. Quite what this statement means is unclear – it could be the definition of what sensors, weapons and other systems the RAAF’s Sky Guardian will carry, or it could be the progression to contract signature with GA-ASI…or both. 

The UK’s Protector RG Mk1 will feature sensors and communications systems of European origin so that it may better integrate with other systems in service in that region. Australia will likely have a requirement for its Sky Guardians to integrate sensors and other systems that are more interoperable with those operated by the US and other Indo-Pacific regional partners. 

To this end, GA-ASI has assembled a comprehensive group of Australian industry members to not only sustain the system in service, but to develop and integrate Australian-specific capabilities for the system. 

“Local companies that provide a range of innovative sensor, communication, manufacturing and life-cycle support capabilities will have the opportunity to showcase their capabilities throughout this development process,” Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price said in the November 28 statement. “Australian defence industries are world-class and are extremely well-placed to be involved in projects like this.” 

Announced in 2017, ‘Team Reaper’ comprises GA-ASI, Cobham, CAE Australia, Raytheon Australia, Flight Data Systems, TAE Aerospace, Rockwell Collins, Ultra Electronics Australia, Airspeed, and Quickstep Holdings Ltd. 

By Max Blenkin 

This article appeared in the Nov-Dec 2019 issue of ADBR.

When the UK announced in March 2019 that it would buy five Boeing E-7A AEW&C aircraft, the Australian government promptly issued a media statement citing this as a big win for Australian defence industry. 

“The UK acquisition is expected to deliver 100 jobs to the Brisbane and Newcastle based staff of Boeing Defence Australia, taking advantage of their world-leading capabilities in systems and software engineering and deep experience in Wedgetail support, including ground based aircrew training,” then Defence Industry Minister, now Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds said. 

“Further opportunities – including for the more than 200 Australian companies that have contributed to our own Wedgetail acquisition and sustainment – will be available for Australian industry in the supply chain.” 

Eight months on, this has certainly created work in Australia, although perhaps not on the scale breathlessly forecast. More will certainly come, but the really alluring prospect of recapitalising of the USAF fleet of ageing Boeing 707 E-3C Sentry AWACS aircraft, remains at best, uncertain.  

Further, Boeing simply can’t sell Wedgetails to just anyone. That’s because the aircraft is full of systems containing advanced technology which falls under the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and this requires State Department approval for sale. 

So how good is the UK acquisition of five E-7s going to be for Australian industry? “Great. We are supporting the UK wedgetail out of Australia today,” Scott Carpendale, the new Managing Director of Boeing Defence Australia told a recent media briefing. 

“We have a leading role in supporting the establishment of the UK program, both supporting the development of the UK aircraft and aircraft systems, but also making sure the UK Ministry of Defence is able to establish a support infrastructure that gives them the same capability as Australia,” he added. 

“We have a Project team. We have people in Williamtown who are building some of the ground segments to be shipped to the UK. We are doing software development in Australia that is part of an integrated software development team for the UK software baseline. There is a range of different areas.” 

Currently Australia, with six aircraft, is the largest operator of Wedgetail. The Republic of Korea operates four E-7 Peace Eye aircraft and Turkey also four E-7s which it calls Peace Eagles. 

It’s not clear just where Turkey now sits with the US on E-7, considering its expulsion from the international F-35 program because of its insistence on acquiring a Russian S-400 missile defence system (see article on page XX). Boeing wasn’t about to comment. But Turkey already has possession of its four aircraft, so this may not be an issue. 

Australia was lead customer for Wedgetail, developed specifically in response to the Australian AIR 5077 requirement for an advanced airborne early warning and control capability.  

When the project encountered major technical problems and delays, Australia came close to pulling the plug. But it chose to persevere, as did Boeing – which took substantial losses on the project – on the expectation it would make good on future sales. 

What emerged is very good indeed – the proven and widely used Boeing 737 airframe, coupled with the Northrop Grumman MESA (Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array) radar plus advanced mission systems. 

“We still view the Australian Wedgetail program as a world class and world leading capability,” Carpendale said. “As the threat environment of the future continues to evolve, having a capability of that nature will be attractive to multiple customers. But we are working really closely with the US as to how we pursue those opportunities.” 

Italy, Qatar and the UAE have all been reported to be interested in E-7, as is NATO which operates 16 E-3 aircraft to support its operations in Europe and internationally. But the UAE has acquired the Saab-developed Bombardier Global 6000-based Globaleye AEW&C, and Italy operates the IAI/Gulfstream G550 conformal AEW (CAEW). 

In June, NATO AEW&C program general manager Brigadier General Michael Gschossmann mused about replacing their elderly Sentry aircraft with a Boeing 737-based capability. That could only mean Wedgetail or something very similar. “We have to ensure that we acquire a system that has growth potential but that also for financial and time reasons is based on existing capabilities,” he told Reuters. 

But more recent reporting suggests NATO is instead leaning towards upgrading its E-3As instead of replacing them. 

The UK’s aircraft will be based on the Australian aircraft, technically making them E-7A. It’s not known if the RAF will retain the E-7A designation and Wedgetail name, or more likely, a combination of the numerical designation and their own name as they have done with their E-3D ‘Sentry’, and RC-135V ‘Airseeker’. 

The UK opted for a single-source procurement, going straight for the E-7 and bypassing a contest which would have involved Airbus and Saab which teamed up to offer Saab’s Erieye radar on an Airbus A330 airframe. 

The deal was announced in March but appears to have been under serious consideration for some time, with then UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson announcing last October that discussions were under way with Boeing. The UK Ministry of Defence had also talked to the RAAF, while RAF aircrew have trained in Australia aboard RAAF Wedgetails. 

Former Defence Minister Christopher Pyne took some of the credit. At the third Australia-United Kingdom Defence Industry Dialogue (AUKDID) in London in July 2018, Mr Pyne pitched Wedgetail to his UK counterparts. 

“During the Dialogue I took the opportunity to further promote Australia’s world-class Wedgetail capability to the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defence and the then Minister for Defence Procurement,” he said. “Deeper engagement between both countries’ defence industries, including through increased exports and industry partnerships, will further strengthen our bilateral relationship with the United Kingdom.” 

UK aircraft will be manufactured in the US on the Boeing 737 production line, but will be modified to E-7 standard, with the addition of the MESA “top hat” radar and mission systems, by Marshall Aerospace and Defence Group at Cambridge in the UK. The first aircraft is scheduled for delivery around 2023. 

The UK Wedgetail acquisition follows another sole-source acquisition of Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, also based on the 737 and also operated by Australia. The first of nine RAF P-8s was handed over recently, and will be delivered to RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland next year. 

The two sole-source deals with Boeing prompted criticism from some politicians that the UK was getting too close to the Americans, but the UK government’s Wedgetail announcement certainly highlighted the Australian connection. 

“This deal strengthens our vital military partnership with Australia,” said Secretary Williamson. “We will operate the same state-of-the-art F-35 jets and world-class Type-26 warships, and this announcement will help us work even more closely together.”  

Boeing Australia and the RAAF have formed what they call Team Wedgetail. The UK isn’t yet a member, but soon could be. Boeing Australia director of emerging markets Matt Buckle said the Australian and UK governments would collaborate in areas of E-7 where it made sense to collaborate. 

“It is no surprise that that is what they are looking at, and how they can learn from Australia as they introduce the capability,” he said. “But the formality of those structures doesn’t exist today.”  

One area of potential future E-7 cooperation with the UK is in an ongoing Australia-only Wedgetail upgrade program through project AIR 5077 Phase 5A. Under the Integrated Investment Plan (IIP), that phase is costed at $500-750 million. 

This program reflects the reality that although Wedgetail is considered to be a state-of-the-art capability, some of its systems have been superseded by improved technology. The first Wedgetail flew in 2002 and, once the RAAF’s classic Hornets retire in 2022, the E-7As will be the RAAF’s second oldest platform after the C-130J Hercules. 

Proposed avionics modifications will bring Wedgetails up to the same capability for navigation in congested airspace as current production civil 737s. This includes upgraded civil TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance) and ADS-B Out (Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast) systems. 

Significantly, Wedgetail IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) will be upgraded from Mode 4 to Mode 5. This is a crucial cyber-security enhancement, with Australia following the US military. This will eventually be applied to all ADF aircraft. 

Mode 5 IFF offers more robust security, particularly against spoofing which could potentially involve a potential unfriendly aircraft pretending to be a coalition aircraft and evading air defences. Although that appears a remote possibility, it was perceived as sufficiently serious for the US to mandate moving to more secure IFF for its combat aircraft. 

Along with the IFF there will be improvements to encrypted datalinks, cryptographic upgrades for better security and also wideband satellite for the anticipated expansion in information flow, allowing Wedgetail to deal with high definition imagery. “I agree that some of this capability would certainly appeal to the UK,” Carpendale said. 

There are no upgrade plans for the actual radar hardware, although IFF forms part of the MESA software. Neither does the airframe, which is regarded as supremely reliable, need any attention. 

The USAF operates a fleet of 32 E-3 Sentry aircraft which have been steadily updated with improved mission systems. However, the Boeing 707 is long out of production – the last was made in 1994 – and airframes are becoming more costly and difficult to support. 

As well, the USAF operates 17 E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) aircraft, also based on the Boeing 707 airframe. This is a surveillance aircraft designed to track vehicle movements at long distance. 

With JSTARS slated to start retiring this year, the USAF has launched a new study program to look at replacement capabilities. This complex program is called Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) and, while it was initially looking at a new platform-based system, it now aims to replace JSTARS with a network of existing and new air-based and space-based sensors.  

Buckle said the ABMS program was ill-defined at this stage. “They are going for an analysis of alternatives, and that will take some time before it matures,” he said. “We’d like to think that something that is along the lines of the Wedgetail could play a role in that program. But depending on where they go in their analysis of alternatives, that may or may not happen.” 

Buckle said ABMS was now considering air battle management as a concept, not necessarily at replacing platform for platform. “It’s saying what do we need from an air battle management system going forward and what does that look like now,” he said. 

Could that involve Wedgetail or a future variant of Wedgetail? Buckle said they would be guided by the statement of needs from the analysis of alternatives. 

“We aren’t going to plough down the path of developing that capability for the US market if that’s not what they look to for their future needs,” he said. “Whether that involves space or other capabilities in terms of what their future air battle management concept is, will guide how we support that.” 

By Max Blenkin 

This article appeared in the Nov-Dec 2019 issue of ADBR

The Army’s new Project LAND 2072 Phase 2B Currawong Battlespace Communications System (BCS), a world-class wholly Australian-designed and produced capability, is looking increasingly attractive to the US and British Armies. 

Both of these key allies are in the process of modernising their military communications systems, and Boeing Defence Australia is pitching Currawong or elements of the system to meet some or all of their particular requirements. 

Others allies such as New Zealand could also be interested, but right now it is the US and UK which are live prospects. 

Darcy Rawlinson, Boeing Defence Australia business development manager for deployed network communications systems, said Currawong met or exceeded many of the requirements of the UK Project Trinity which aims to develop a wide area network for their Army headquarters. 

“What we will be offering is something based on the technology in Currawong,” he said. “We do have the ability to modify that there as the UK has slightly different requirements. The UK will go out and do a competitive tender and look for that over the next couple of years.” 

Then there’s Project Niobe, a vehicle-based networking solution. Whereas Australia names military communications projects after native birds, the UK seems to favour names of mythological characters. 

Rawlinson said their experience with the ‘Headquarters on the Move’ development, a Currawong system in a Bushmaster armoured vehicle and the deployed data module in the back of a Hawkei protected mobility vehicle, were relevant to what the UK sought. “We are looking to work with the UK Ministry of Defence and do some concept demonstrations,” he said. 

The US Army is also looking at upgrading its tactical network. Initially called the Warfighting Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T), the requirement has now been named the Integrated Tactical Network. 

“Some of the senior leaders in the US Army have gone on the record saying it is not quite the network they need for the next war – it’s not quite ready to, as they say, fight tonight,” Rawlinson said. “So they are looking at a range of different technologies from a range of different vendors. There are certainly elements of Currawong they are interested in. 

“We have spoken to them over the last year explaining our system for them to understand where it could fit into that broader integrated tactical network,” he added. “They are quite keen to take it to the next stage of doing some testing with it in their labs in the US so they can understand exactly how it performs.” 

What the US has in mind is for Currawong to perform some of the heavy lifting in their network, the routing and network management system. Rawlinson said these were the elements that dealt with that really adverse environment in which military forces operated, one where there is never sufficient bandwidth, and a congested and contested spectrum. 

“The network is highly dynamic, unlike in an enterprise environment where you wire up a building which stays there and will be there the next day,” Rawlinson said. “Here our headquarters are constantly moving. It is really important that the network is very agile and flexible to deal with all that, while reducing the amount of complexities that soldiers have to deal with. 

“That’s where Currawong really comes into it – it does that,” he added. “We have managed to crack that nut for the Australian Army. The US sees that as something they think can really enhance their network as something well worth looking at.” 

In Australian service, Currawong is replacing Parakeet, a communications network developed in the 1990s and which was then regarded as very advanced. Parakeet gave the Australian military encrypted satellite communications, though essentially from point-to-point rather than as an integrated network. 

Currawong provides vastly more capability, versatility and redundancy. “Basically it gives you everything you normally get out of your mobile phone,” Currawong project director Ian Vett said.  

“Of course there is no infrastructure in the deployed environment,” he added. “It does that through providing core network capability, a mission system manager that sits on top and manages…and then all the bearers.” 

Currawong features multiple communications options for deployed forces. Mostly that would be by satellite, specifically the US military WGS constellation which provides fast, secure high bandwidth comms. However Australia only has proportional access to WGS on the basis of us funding one of the 10 WGS satellites, while two more are planned. The ADF can also use the Optus C1 satellite through a hosted defence payload. 

Currawong features other communications options – microwave high capacity line-of-sight which is good out to around 80 kilometres, and troposcatter which provides high bandwidth reliable communications to around 200 kilometres. Should the circumstances permit, it’s entirely possible to connect Currawong nodes by fibre optic cable which is secure and delivers very high bandwidth. 

Finally, Currawong can use existing infrastructure – the internet – through a new capability for secure communications called External Network Access Point (ENAP). The troposcatter and ENAP capabilities, along with the new medium satellite terminal, will be delivered soon through Currawong Release 2. 

Vett said people might think all this wasn’t so hard as their own office network worked perfectly well. “Obviously we don’t have mobile phone towers and things like that when these guys are fighting the fight, so we have to bring in all that. That’s what Currawong is and that’s why it’s so expensive. 

“The thing is this is a deployed battlefield communications system. You are only as good as the bearer you’ve got,” Vett said. “The trick here is not how much bandwidth you get. The trick is with limited bandwidth, what can you do with it?  

“We get voice over very bad lines that have a lot of delay,” he added. “With a 32 kilobit line you can still get video. You also have to move quickly. You have to be able to pick it up, dump it around and immediately get it working again.” 

The $950 million project – taking in support and acquisition contracts it’s actually a bit over $1 billion – dates back to the early 2000s and has followed a tortuous course, with projects merged, terminated and resurrected. 

Boeing was awarded the contract for what is now LAND 2072 Phase 2B in September 2015, although the company had been working on it since 2011. Boeing’s Release 1 technology was delivered just 27 months after contract signature, a notable achievement considering the extensive software and hardware development required. Release 2 is under way and Release 3 is planned for late next year. 

Significantly, because Currawong was developed in Australia, it comes without ITAR-added complications and restrictions of US technology.     

For the Currawong project, Boeing decided to develop its own $7.5 million test and assembly centre in the Brisbane suburb of Wacol, officially opened by Defence Industry Minister Melissa Price at the end of October. 

The minister said this was a further demonstration that major companies were seeing the opportunities and making significant investments in Australia’s defence industry. 

New Boeing Defence Australia Managing Director Scott Carpendale said that, before the Wacol facility was opened, Boeing had to send equipment interstate and overseas for testing to ensure it would work wherever it was needed, be that in snow or desert conditions. 

“Now we can do it right here, quickly and to the most rigorous standards,” he said. “This enables us to be more agile with our development, to identify and address issues earlier and to deliver capability to the Australian Defence Force faster.” 

Lockheed Martin is steadily maturing the Attack class submarine combat system 

By Max Blenkin 

This article appeared in the Nov-Dec 2019 issue of ADBR.

Submarines – like any warship – only exist to keep their electronics, weapons and crew dry, and to get them where they need to be. That’s not at all well-appreciated in the ongoing public discussion around Australia’s 12 new Project SEA 1000 Attack class submarines and their design by prime, France’s Naval Group. 

Proceeding steadily but with less public commentary is the combat system design, development and integration by Lockheed Martin Australia. The combat system accounts for a significant portion of the overall project – the basic rule of thumb is that the combat system in a modern warship accounts for around 20 per cent of total project cost.  

Considering the future submarines project has been costed around $50 billion, that places the combat system component at about $10 billion. This work is proceeding at a steady pace. 

In October the combat system development review was completed, with the next major combat system milestone the preliminary design review (PDR) in the second half of 2021, followed by the critical design review (CDR) in the first half of 2023. 

Mike Oliver, Lockheed Martin’s program director for the submarines’ combat system, said this system would be state-of the-art, and will be a step on from the combat system aboard the Navy’s six Collins class subs which employ a version of the US Navy AN/BYG-1. 

“This boat will be operational out to the 2070s,” Oliver told ADBR. “It’s important that we understand that boat one will not be the same as boat 12.  

“What we have to achieve is flexibility in our design so we can accommodate those new technologies as they come along, so we can keep the functionality of the combat system,” he added. “We call it pacing the threat, keeping in front of the adversary.” 

Oliver said the proposed system would feature some basic functionality which would be pretty identical to what was aboard just about any submarine in the world today. 

“What really makes the combat system unique are the sensors we are putting on the boat and the amount of data and information coming from those sensors,” he said. “That’s where you start seeing this big improvement on contemporary boats of the day. It is just taking advantage of the technology.  

“The processing power is getting more and more every year and how we take advantage of that to actually process more of the data and present that to the operator.” 

In simple terms, the combat system links the submarine sensors – bow, flank and towed array sonars – with the weapon system, the Mark 48 torpedoes, and maybe eventually submarine-launched missiles. Information is presented to operators in the submarine control room, where the commander can then make the appropriate decisions.    

The Navy had big ambitions for the Collins combat system, but the then available technology was barely up to the task and integration proved difficult, protracted and costly.  

Of all the many problems afflicting the Collins boats in the early years, the combat system was the most intractable. It was only fully remediated with the decision to go to AN/BYG-1, installed first aboard HMAS Waller in 2008. That was 15 years after the launch of HMAS Collins. 

The Attack class’s combat system will be mostly fully developed and proven long before it’s actually installed on a submarine. 

“I anticipate starting what I will call pre-production and prototype development in the 2022-23 timeframe and our strategy and aim is to evolve the combat system and get that early so I can work to find the problems and issues through the lab-based integration before I deliver it to the shipyard to be integrated,” Oliver said. 

“The timeline to deliver to the shipyard is in 2028. That’s delivery and integration into the platform. Platform integration will be a little bit beyond that before the boat actually hits the water.” 

The Attack class combat system will be based on the AN/BYG-1, but will feature enhancements through improved technology plus additional capabilities. It is being designed with full open architecture to accommodate emerging technologies such as unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). 

“We are designing the combat system to accommodate whenever those become available,” Oliver said. “There is a lot of research and development being done by a lot of the navies of the world on how they want to use unmanned submersibles and unmanned aircraft. We have designed the combat system architecture to accommodate when that capability comes along.” 

The design team is also looking to integrate automation of some systems, where appropriate. Oliver said there were some ship functions which could be automated. “There are some things, because they involve ship safety or ability to protect that ship, where you always want a human in the loop,” he said. 

One consideration not yet finalised is how many crew members will an Attack-class boat need? A Collins boat’s complement is 45.  

“It’s not just the ability to man the consoles and the attack centre, but you have to look at the total ship – damage control and all these sorts of things, what’s the number you need,” Oliver said. 

John Towers, Lockheed Martin’s lead for submarine combat system human integration added, “There is a lot of work being done now in terms of the complement. To understand what are the tasks and how we effectively design roles for the future submarine, that is an ongoing effort.”  

Unlike Collins, Attack class boats will be fitted with an optronic mast with day/night vision capability in place of the traditional optical periscope. This has a significant advantage for submarine design in that it doesn’t penetrate the pressure hull, and frees up interior space. 

It also provides additional inputs to the combat system from the mast’s high definition cameras. An optronic mast also supports antennae for communications and electronic surveillance. 

Oliver said in the combat system design, they were aiming for complete separation from the hull design. “We know the combat system will continue to evolve. I want to be able to evolve and upgrade that combat system relatively quickly without impacting ship design. 

“We are smarter in those interfaces. When I do an evolution of the combat system, it doesn’t impact the ship as long as I stay within my margins,” he added. “We have a vision to be able to upgrade and update the combat system pier-side so it doesn’t have to go into mid-cycle or full cycle docking.” 

However Lockheed Martin and Naval Group will still need to work together in the design process to make everything fit. “As Naval Group is progressing their design they need to know attachment points, cable runs and all those sorts of things so they can design the boat to accommodate that,” Oliver said.  

“The challenge is making sure as I deliver the interface control drawings that they are correctly interpreted by Naval Group. That is one of the reasons I have a small team in Cherbourg.” 

That starts at gross conceptual level and eventually moves to 100 per cent accuracy. Initially the combat system team specified basic space, weight and power requirements to allow Naval Group to do what they term their balances. “We have all those information exchange touch points with Naval Group, well defined on when we owe them data and they owe me data,” Oliver said. 

The control room is the beating heart of any submarine, traditionally located beneath the conning tower so the commander can readily access the periscope. Operators stare intently at consoles displaying graphic coloured representation of signals from the sonar sensors. 

But using an optronic mast means the control room need not be located directly beneath the conning tower. On USN Virginia class nuclear attack boats, the control room has been moved one floor down, providing substantially more space. 

Designing the combat system and the control room to provide operators and the commander with the most useful and timely information is a key task of the development process. 

John Towers said their objective was to ensure the combat system allowed operators to perform at optimum level. That applies to all aspects involving the operators – from physical design of combat system elements through to the cognitive effort they have to apply to any particular task.  

“We are responsible for ensuring that is not excessive and they have the right information at the right time in the right format to perform the tasks we are expecting them to,” he said. 

“It really involved in the first instance establishing a baseline of understanding for which existing doctrine and workflow on the submarines they (the Navy) definitely don’t  want to change, what works well.” 

There’s actually a well-established engineering methodology for human factors on the program. “We have done sea rides, we observe training, interviewed submariners,” Towers said. “What that helps us do is get a starting point and a baseline to establish early task models.  

“We develop high level scenarios and then the underlying work flow of tasks and roles and role interactions, heavily leveraging in the first instance off Collins. It is going to evolve with new functions and optimisation of operations. 

“Then we move into simulation of those models,” he added. “We use a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) simulation tool. We have invested heavily in human system integration on the program to the point where we have a really well-established best practice for these activities, and it has given us an opportunity to really leverage that and start developing some of our own tools that take it to the next level.” 

Then it moves on to physical design. Right now that involves some cardboard mockups of workstations to assess lines of sight. “Then we are building a very representative combat system simulator,” Towers said. 

“As part of that we will start getting submariners into the lab and having them dynamically work with the combat system and we will extract performance measures of how well they are doing, how well our mitigation strategies work for issues we perhaps find in the modelling.” 

Towers said all through this process, they were working closely with the Navy. “They are gaining an insight into what we are thinking, how we are interpreting results, what’s accurate and what they believe is maybe a bit off track for one reason or another,” he said. 

Oliver, a former USN submariner, said in the past each control room operator had a particular role. “My job was just to look at the data coming from a particular sensor. That’s all I did. I had somebody else working other sensors. Nobody had the ability to integrate that full situational awareness picture seamlessly. 

“Today it’s not so much role-based – looking at the towed array or the flank array or the bow array,” he added. “You are just looking at the data. You don’t really care where the data is coming from. You can find it if you want but it is presenting that as a total picture. 

“The systems now integrate that data to present you with a different picture. You still have the ability to drill in to see the data if you want to. But you find out if you do that you start getting tunnel vision. That’s not just sonar – it’s all of the sensors.” 

Lockheed Martin is also looking to industry and academia for ideas, offering research grants for particular research projects in search of capabilities of the future. 

“They will give us the results of their research paper and we will analyse and assess those and, if it merits further research, we will fund them up to an additional million dollars to mature that capability,” Oliver said. 

“We go through that annually and the idea is that we keep this flow of new ideas in this pipeline. Some things will come out the end and go into the system as the technology is available. 

“Some things may not be quite ready, and we may keep it in the pipeline a little bit longer. The idea is to build the capability and capacity in Australia.” 

The ADF’s ambitious efforts to build a world-class joint force electronic warfare capability will soon be bolstered by the high-flying Peregrine 

By Andrew McLaughlin 

This article appeared in the Nov-Dec 2019 issue of ADBR.

The RAAF’s MC-55A Peregrine electronic warfare support system project will soon hit a key milestone, with the delivery of the fourth and final ‘green’ Gulfstream G550 airframe to the US Air Force for modification under the Peregrine program. 

Three aircraft are already at Greenville and are being prepared to receive the all-important sensors, mission systems and other modifications. After that, a comprehensive test campaign will follow prior to deliveries to the RAAF commencing in early 2023. 

PROJECT PEREGRINE 

MC-55A will initially be a unique designation for the RAAF’s missionised G550s, whereas other operators use variations of the US Department of Defense’s C-37 designation, or just retain the G550.  

The aircraft are delivered from Gulfstream’s Savannah, Georgia factory to Greenville with most of the external modifications already completed during manufacture. Gulfstream has a long history of producing missionised versions of its high-flying and long-ranging business jets, and the G550 in particular has been modified more than most. 

While there had been some rumours in 2015 that a new G550-based EW capability was being considered for the RAAF, first official confirmation of the project and the MC-55 designation came in the 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) and supporting Integrated Investment Plan (IIP). 

‘From the early 2020s, Defence will acquire up to five long-range electronic warfare support aircraft based on the Gulfstream G550 airframe with additional and modified systems,’ the IIP reads. ‘This capability will substantially enhance electronic warfare support to naval, air and land forces for operations in electromagnetic environments manipulated by hostile forces, with the operating cost, range and endurance benefits of a commercial airframe.  

‘The aircraft will be acquired in two tranches and incrementally upgraded to maintain commonality with the United States-developed systems for long-term supportability and to maintain interoperability.’ 

Shortly after, then Defence Minister Senator Marise Payne revealed the MC-55A designation for the first time in her keynote address to the March 2016 Airpower Conference in Canberra. But curiously, any reference to this has been omitted from the official online transcript of her speech. 

In a June 2017 notification, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) advised Congress that the US State Department had approved a ‘possible foreign military sale (FMS) to Australia for Gulfstream G550 aircraft modified to integrate Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Electronic Warfare (AISREW) mission systems.’ 

The notification added that Australia had requested ‘up to five G550’ aircraft, and that the then estimated US$1.3bn (A$1.92bn) package included the mission systems, GPS capabilities, secure communications, aircraft defensive systems, aircraft modification and integration, flight test and certification, and associated ground systems. The package also included spares, US Govt and contractor engineering services, logistics, and program support. 

‘The proposed sale supports and complements the ongoing efforts of Australia to modernize its electronic warfare capability and increases interoperability between the USAF and the RAAF,’ the notification added. 

The next public release of information about the project came in July 2018 when the US DoD awarded L3 Technologies a US$83m (A$122m) contract for the upgrade of the first two G550s for the RAAF. The contract announcement also named the USAF’s 645th Aeronautical Systems Group, also known as ‘Big Safari’, based at Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio as the contracting authority. Big Safari has extensive experience with the design and development of airborne electronic intelligence (ELINT) capabilities in a classified environment. 

In March 2019, the Commonwealth formally announced that four MC-55As would be acquired for A$2.46bn. Former Defence Minister Christopher Pyne and then Minister for Defence Industry Senator Linda Reynolds announced the acquisition of the aircraft in a March 18 joint statement which confirmed the aircraft will be based at RAAF Edinburgh near Adelaide alongside RAAF Surveillance & Response Group (SRG) P-8A Poseidon, MQ-4C Triton and MQ-9 Predator/Reaper intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems.  

“The Peregrine is a new airborne electronic warfare capability that will be integrated into Defence’s joint warfighting networks, providing a critical link between platforms, including the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, E-7A Wedgetail, EA-18G Growler, Navy’s surface combatants and amphibious assault ships and ground assets to support the warfighter,” former Minister Pyne said in the statement. 

“This capability and the people who operate it will bring Air Force a step closer to becoming a fully networked fifth-generation force and further exploit the joint combat multiplier effects on exercises and operations.”  

In a company statement, then L3 Technologies chairman, CEO and president Christopher Kubasik said, “Our mission solution and electronic warfare capabilities are highly sought after by our allies. As business jets are increasingly utilised for EW purposes, we have invested in miniaturising our capabilities to deliver new resources for our customers. Australia is a very important market for L3, and we look forward to a long and productive partnership with the RAAF and the local supplier base in support of the Peregrine program.” 

In the same statement, L3 ISR Systems business segment president Jeff Miller added, “This capability will greatly strengthen the RAAF’s goal to becoming a fully networked fifth-generation force and considerably enhance their global effect on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. It will serve as a critical link between air, land and sea assets to provide airborne electronic warfare support to Commonwealth and allied warfighters in complex operating environments.” 

GULFSTREAM G550  

The Gulfstream G550 is the extended range and roomier follow-on from the GV and G450 long-range large cabin business jets which preceded it. 

Originally dubbed the GV-SP, the G550 was first certified by the FAA in August 2003, and was replaced in business jet production in 2019 by the G600 which features a larger cabin and more modern cockpit. In total – and somewhat appropriately – nearly 550 G550s have been manufactured.  

This total includes about 10 C-37 military/VIP transports, and about 20 G550 special mission aircraft equipped with airborne early warning, command and control, high altitude research, and electronic warfare support systems. Because of its popularity, flexibility and proven capabilities, the G550 special mission catalogue remains available while there is still demand.  

The G550 bizjet offers sparkling performance, and the various special mission versions have been developed to closely match it. Its two Rolls-Royce BR 710-C4-11 engines each produce 15,400lbf of thrust giving the 90,000lb aircraft a maximum speed of M.89 and a cruise altitude of about 50,000ft. Maximum range is quoted as 6,750nm (12,500km), equating to about 14 hours endurance at an economical cruise speed. The same engines or derivatives of them power the Boeing 717 airliner, Bombardier Global Express business jet, and the larger Gulfstream G650ER, and have been proposed to re-engine the B-52H. 

MC-55A CONFIGURATION 

Despite most of the MC-55A’s external ‘lumps and bumps’ and other apertures having already been integrated with various other special mission G550s built to date, the RAAF’s jets will have a unique combination of these. The most notable external features will be a forward fuselage underside ‘canoe’ fairing, an upper fuselage or dorsal SATCOM antenna fairing, a bulbous rear tail cone fairing which houses an integrated electro-optical infrared (EO/IR) turret, and an antenna fairing on the top of the vertical stabiliser.  

What the MC-55A won’t feature is the large fuselage side ‘cheek’ fairings used by the conformal airborne early warning (CAEW) version of the G550 as operated by Italy, Singapore and Israel, and on the US Navy’s NC-37B range control aircraft. 

For some special mission applications including that of the MC-55A, the G550’s two BR 710 engines are each fitted with a 240kW generator which runs off a shaft into the engine and is faired into the underside of the nacelle. These provide additional electrical and cooling power to the sensitive mission systems and sensor arrays.  

Even in special mission form, the baseline G550’s performance is a key capability; its cruise and maximum speeds allows it to keep pace with fast jet strike and air combat packages. Its operating altitude gives its sensors a huge field of regard, while its unrefuelled endurance allows it to cover most of Western Pacific or Eastern Indian Oceans from Darwin with plenty of time on station. No G550s have been converted for air-to-air refuelling. 

But while the G550 shines in performance compared to other commercial derivatives, it has a much smaller cabin than even the 737 which has spawned the E-7A Wedgetail and P-8A Poseidon. At 47.2m3, the G550’s cabin is almost one-quarter the size of the 184m3 cabin 737-700/BBJ upon which the E-7A Wedgetail is based, and smaller again than the 224m3 737-800 which forms the basis of the P-8A Poseidon. 

While no interior configuration details of the MC-55A have been released, an IAI graphic shows Israeli CAEW G550s have six large screen forward and rear-facing mission consoles in three rows of two each with an aisle in between, and a small galley and lavatory module. 

BIG SAFARI 

Big Safari sits under the 303rd Aeronautical Systems Wing (303 ASW) of the US Air Force Materiel Command, and has a long history of developing and supporting US and allied ISR capabilities. 

Its mission statement reads, ‘The Big Safari acquisition and sustainment system employs the necessary flexibility to respond to high-priority, dynamic operational requirements for programs that involve a limited number of systems that require a rapid response to changes in the operational environment throughout the life of the system. 

‘Big Safari focuses on acquiring, fielding, and sustaining key operational capabilities that otherwise would not be achievable or supportable in the required timeframe. Events and processes are tailored to meet the user’s operational and schedule needs.’ 

In a 2010 address to the Air Force Association, then Secretary of the Air Force Michael B Donley said, “Big Safari has long been an alternative acquisition source for certain high priority, rapid-reaction, urgent Combatant Commander needs…unmatched culture of responsiveness…which continues to evolve and adapt in our current operational environment.” 

Big Safari isn’t subject to much of the same public scrutiny of its contracting and acquisition activities as other US DoD organisations. But much of this scrutiny undoubtedly takes place behind closed doors, as much of its activity is conducted under the US DoD’s huge covert ‘black’ budget which, at an estimated US$50bn (A$73bn) a year, is almost double that of Australia’s entire annual defence budget.  

Despite its low profile, Big Safari has the capabilities to manage projects end-to-end, including contracting, financial management, program management, engineering, test and evaluation, operations, maintenance, and sustainment. It is believed to manage more than 40 separate programs for multiple customers. As such, it enjoys a degree of flexibility and agility that other programs can only dream about.  

“The US Air Force and Big Safari are great to work with,” the RAAF’s Director of ISREW, GPCAPT Jason Lind told ADBR. “This acquisition is an FMS project, and Big Safari is a very sophisticated engineering organisation.” 

Some of its better-known programs include the RC-135 series of aircraft systems, including the RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, RC-135S Cobra Ball, and WC-135W Constant Phoenix systems. Although all based on the same 1950s-vintage C-135 airframe and, being externally visually similar, these distinctive systems have been continuously upgraded and enhanced by L3, and are key US national strategic ISR assets. 

Other programs that Big Safari has been involved in include the L3 MC-12W Liberty ISR system based on the King Air 350/350ER airframe, the early rapid development program to weaponise the GA-ASI MQ-1A Predator with Hellfire AGMs following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the EC-130H Compass Call electronic warfare derivative of the Hercules, and the current BAE Systems EC-37B Compass Call II ‘Cross Deck Initiative’ program which is also to be based on the G550. 

Big Safari has also been involved with the acquisition and systems integration of the USAF’s fleet of light commercial-derivative aircraft which provide discreet transport and ISR support to special forces command operations. These include Dornier 328-based C-146 Wolfhound and its Do328Jet or ‘DoJet’ development, the Pilatus PC12-based U-28A, the PZL M-28, and various other types such as CASA/Airbus C-295s, Bombardier Dash-8s, and King Airs/C-12s. 

Older programs include the development of the Ryan BQM-34 Firefly and AQM-34 Lightning Bug surveillance and ELINT drones in the 1960s, and the management of the resurrection of three SR-71A Blackbirds for the USAF from 1994 before that program was permanently shut down in 1999. 

The organisation is also rumoured to have played a role in the effort to rapidly integrate the battlefield airborne communications node (BACN) payload onto two mothballed NASA WB-57F Canberras for a rapid deployment to Kandahar in 2011 prior to BACN entering service on its intended E-11 (Global Express) and EQ-4 Global Hawk platforms.  

Big Safari is also reportedly closely aligned with the secretive Sierra Nevada Corporation on the development of ISR platforms and systems used in counter-insurgency and anti-drug operations in Central and South America, and facilitated the development of the armed and armoured AT-802U Archangel version of the rugged Air Tractor agricultural aircraft.  

Most relevant to the MC-55A is the L3 RC-135V/W Rivet Joint system operated by the USAF, and by the Royal Air Force as the Airseeker. Rivet Joint is a highly-capable electronic intelligence (ELINT) system capable of recording and classifying emissions from multiple communications, radar, and other systems across a broad spectrum, and many of the systems developed for that program by L3 and other contractors including BAE Systems will likely be leveraged for the Peregrine. 

CAPABILITY 

Details of the MC-55’s mission or capabilities understandably remain closely-held, but the ELINT/ISREW mission is not a new one for the RAAF.  

It was well known within the wider Australian defence community that the RAAF had operated two AP-3C Orions and at least one C-130H Hercules in an ISREW role for nearly two decades under the three-phased Project Peacemate.  

But apart from a few spurious Parliamentary Hansard references from the early 2000s, there is little on the record about the existence of these aircraft let alone their capabilities. Interestingly, it was only after the last of the ‘regular’ maritime patrol AP-3Cs were retired in late 2018 did your writer notice what is likely the first public ADF acknowledgement of the existence of the “AP-3C (Electronic Warfare)” platforms when, in February 2019, one of the aircraft deployed to Exercise Red Flag 19-1 at Nellis AFB in Nevada.  

The two AP-3C (EW) airframes were modified in the US, based on requirements captured from lessons learned after several years of operating in the Middle East area of operations.  

Despite the removal of all external serial numbers from the Orion fleet during the Sentinel upgrade, the AP-3C EW airframes were externally distinguishable by their lack of sonar buoy tubes on the underside of the rear fuselage. And much like the RAF’s Nimrod R.1 and the US Navy’s EP-3E Aries ELINT derivatives, they were effectively permanently consigned to their new EW role in place of their more traditional anti-submarine and maritime patrol missions.  

The AP-3C EWs have received continual technological refreshes, keeping them at the leading edge of passive ISREW capabilities, and making them key electronic and visual ISR assets for the ADF and coalition forces. 

The RAAF is keen to point out that, while the timing of the introduction of the MC-55A will coincide with the planned withdrawal of the two AP-3C EWs, the Peregrine is not a replacement for the AP-3C (EW) Orions. “This is a new capability, not an evolution,” GPCAPT Lind told us. “This will be airborne ISR done in a different way.” 

Industry experts equate the AP-3C EW and the MC-55A’s capabilities to that of the RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, albeit in a somewhat smaller package. This means that, like Rivet Joint, many of the key sensors on the aircraft will be likely provided by L3Harris and/or BAE Systems, giving the aircraft the capability to monitor, record and classify a wide portion of the microwave and radio wave end of the electromagnetic spectrum, from mobile phone and Wi-Fi networks, to large integrated air defence systems. 

The co-location of the MC-55A with the P-8A, MQ-4C Triton, and the growing ADF ‘ISR Hub’ which comprises the tri-service Joint Electronic Warfare Operational Support Unit (JEWOSU), elements of the F-35-focused Australia-Canada-UK Reprogramming Lab (ACURL), and the DGS-AUS (Distributed Ground Station), is no coincidence.  

The Project AIR 3503 DGS-AUS is a new intelligence unit responsible for the analysis of data collected from the various RAAF ISR platforms, and has access to other national intelligence resources and assets. It is capable of rapidly fusing data and information to provide senior military and political decision-makers with enhanced situational awareness. 

The JEWOSU and ACURL are responsible for providing electronic warfare support by building and testing mission data files (MDF) for the RAAF’s combat and ISR platforms and systems, and many of these MDFs include threat libraries which will likely be built with the assistance of the MC-55A’s sensor suite as well as that of the Triton’s Multi-INT system from 2023. Other assets expected to contribute data to the ADF’s threat library include the EA-18G Growler and the F-35A, as well as the highly-capable passive ESM systems onboard the E-7A Wedgetail and the P-8A.  

With all these high-end capabilities coming online in the next five years, the amount of data coming in to the ISR hub will increase exponentially. Therefore, the ability to manage the efficient tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TCPED) of the data will be key. And while manpower will be important, so too will the integration of an appropriate level of artificial intelligence (AI) into the system. 

“We will leverage off dataflows, and we will have a lot more people on the ground than in the aircraft,” said GPCAPT Lind. “We will need to be more flexible about where we get our data, and there will need to be a degree of fusion in the way it is presented. 

“It’s not about the platforms, it’s about all the capabilities working together to achieve a joint force goal,” GPCAPT Lind added. “A lot of effort is being put into this, and the CJC (Chief of Joint Capabilities) is really taking the lead. Senior leadership has a growing idea of what is required to effectively operate these 5th gen systems, and it will be up to us to educate the decision-makers so the appropriate workforces and systems are established.” 

But the manpower issue may not necessarily mean more people are required, but rather new skillsets. “We won’t necessarily need new people, but we’ll be changing the shape of many of those we already have,” GPCAPT Lind said. “Our people won’t just be in uniform. We will have industry, the APS (Australian Public Service), and allies as well. 

“We will obviously need more STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering & Mathematics) people,” he added. “And a key consideration from an ethics viewpoint is the need to maintain a balance between the utilisation of AI and keeping humans in the loop.” 

INTO SERVICE 

Because of the developmental nature of the Peregrine project, L3Harris will conduct a complete flight test campaign and certification program of the MC-55A configuration in conjunction with Big Safari and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). As with all aircraft operated by the ADF, the Chief of Air Force will be the ultimate the ultimate airworthiness authority for the aircraft and its systems. 

No decision has yet been taken as to what squadron will operate the Peregrine. But with the RAAF taking a larger enterprise-level approach to ISREW, the small fleet will be combined with the Triton, MQ-9B/Reaper, E-7A, and the P-8A under the Surveillance and Response Group umbrella. 

The four aircraft are scheduled to be delivered to Australia at the rate of roughly one per year until late 2025. A sustainment model is currently being worked on, but it is likely Industry will be required to become a platform steward for the airframe and many of its systems. Due to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) considerations, some of the more advanced sensors may need to be returned to the US for maintenance and repairs, but this is something the ADF and Industry is becoming more familiar with as new generation capabilities are introduced. 

Training on the MC-55A and its systems will initially be conducted by L3Harris and the USAF at Greenville as part of the initial acquisition package. GPCAPT Lind wouldn’t be drawn on whether this had already commenced, but did offer that the RAAF was looking to streamline the training on and conversion to the aircraft. 

“Training is always a challenge,” he said. “We want to be able to do it more rapidly, but we want to do it safely and efficiently. Regardless of the model we implement, training will always remain a FIC (fundamental input to capability). 

“It’s an exciting capability,” he added in closing. “I’m confident that, after we get it into the hands of motivated operators, this capability will be doing things in 10 years that we haven’t even envisaged yet.” 

The US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has re-stated the importance of the Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton high-altitude long-endurance maritime ISR system for the service.

Testifying to the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Defense subcommittee on March 11, CNO ADM Michael Gilday said the service was committed to the Triton capability.

“We just accelerated the deployment of our first two out to Guam, so they are on station and on mission right now,” ADM Gilday said. “The capabilities that the MQ-4 brings are game-changing in terms of long-range ISR at altitude, with sensors that we haven’t had supporting the fleet before.” 

Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly added, “Unmanned is going to be a huge part of our future. Unmanned is a critical element — not just aerial but unmanned ships as well.”

The future of the Triton program has been in some doubt after planned production of the large UAS for the US Navy was paused for two years in the recent Draft President’s Budget (PB21). The pausing of US Navy production could have an adverse effect on the delivery schedule and cost of the RAAF’s planned Triton introduction due to lower volumes, unless the RAAF can be convinced to bring its production forward to fill the US Navy’s slots.

To this end, ADBR understand Defence’s Investment Committee (IC) met in Canberra in early March and is preparing a recommendation of how to proceed with the program to the National Security Committee of Cabinet for consideration.

By Andrew McLaughlin 

When introducing a new capability, a major factor in its success – or otherwise – is its ability to be successfully integrated with other capabilities.  

This has become particularly crucial with the plethora of increasingly capable and expensive new generation capabilities coming on board, each of which may have multiple sensors which generate huge amounts of data which cannot possibly be processed, exploited, and disseminated by humans alone. A small defence force like the ADF can no longer afford to buy multiple systems with overlapping capabilities which cannot integrate with other services, allies, and coalition partners. 

And so it will be with the MC-55A which will provide an exponential leap in electronic warfare support capability compared to the AP-3C (EW). So great is the leap that, in our Peregrine feature, RAAF Director of ISREW GPCAPT Jason Lind describes it as a “…a new capability, not an evolution”, and that it “…will be airborne ISR done in a different way”. 

The challenge of integrating these and other new electronic and information warfare capabilities into the ADF’s order of battle is a key tasking of the Joint Capabilities Group (JCG) headed by AIRMSHL Warren McDonald, and specifically, JCG’s Director General Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare and Cyber, BRIG Stephen Beaumont. 

In the May-June 2019 issue of ADBR our profile on JCG lightly touched on the role its Information Warfare Division (IWD) plays in developing what has been dubbed the ‘fifth domain’ – the other four being air, land, sea, and space.  Information Warfare capabilities include cyber; electronic warfare; information operations; space-based systems; command, control, and communications systems; and intelligence – all of which need to be integrated to generate coherent information capabilities for the ADF. 

Now that the ADF has multiple platforms and systems equipped with high-end active and passive electronic warfare capabilities – and has more on the way – it is now developing a ‘Force level EW’ concept that describes how these capabilities can ‘plug into’ a useable whole-of-ADF network. 

“The way I think about force level EW is – they’re building some exquisitely joint, really usable capabilities which all single service EW capabilities can plug into,” BRIG Beaumont told ADBR. “This will ensure the networks that they need are there, and the data they need to function properly is available.  

“And when it comes to data, I’m strongly of the view that we aim to, ‘build once, use often’,” he added. “That is, we should build data sets that are accessible and are of a format and standard that many different platforms can use. 

“We are fast moving away from the days where we had stand-alone, platform specific databases that were invisible and inaccessible to other users. If we think of the contemporary battlespace where characterisation of actors/emitters is critical, access to common, shared, data sets will be important.   

“From this we have a chance to build a common understanding of what is occurring in the electromagnetic spectrum, which will help us make choices about how we might wish to manoeuvre in the spectrum – seeking to degrade the adversary’s use of spectrum while enhancing our own.” 

BRIG Beaumont says the IWD is responsible for not only providing the Joint ’back-end’ for existing multi-service EW and IW capabilities, but for also working with Capability Managers and their staff to ensure, as far as possible, new capabilities are designed with the need to integrate into the broader Joint EW capability. 

“Everyone is working towards this end,” he explained. “And it’s not just JCG. Plainly, everything these days is going to have to plumb into an enterprise network, and when you’re talking enterprise networks you very quickly get into the domain of the CIOG (Chief Information Officer Group). So we work very closely with CIOG’s ICT Delivery Division to ensure platforms are integrated into those networks, so the data can flow and be available for processing and reprogramming as necessary. 

“We also have a body of work of our own that we’re progressing through the Joint EW Sub-Program,” BRIG Beaumont added. “This body of work is focussed on building those Joint EW capabilities that will help knit single-service EW capabilities together and enhance the decision making of deployed commanders and EW staff when it comes to spectrum management and the delivery of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. The key capability elements of this program are collaborative geolocation, electromagnetic battle management and EW data management and analytics.  

“A key feature of the Joint EW Sub-Program concerns Electromagnetic Battle Management. Our vision is to have a tool – a scalable tool – that allows commanders and staff at all levels to visualise how the spectrum is being used by all actors in a defined area of operations. This capability will enable genuine manoeuvre in the Electromagnetic Spectrum and should facilitate best possible decision making around use of the spectrum. We are working very closely with the Growler community, other EW users, and Industry as we try to solve this difficult capability problem.  

“This is a hard problem, to have a single tool or interface that allows you to characterise what’s going on in the electromagnetic spectrum. We talk about manoeuvre, JEMSO (joint electromagnetic spectrum operations) and the idea of manoeuvre…I would argue you need a pretty good battle management tool as a first stop capability to allow you to do that.” 

Another of JCG’s challenges in working with Capability Managers to knit single-service EW capabilities together into a coherent whole with the high number of stakeholders involved in determining what capabilities are to be acquired.  

“Stakeholder engagement is one of the key challenges of being in Joint Capabilities Group,” BRIG Beaumont said. “Making this task easier has been the reforms instituted under the First Principles Review. Defence has appointed VCDF as the Joint Force Authority, stood-up Joint Capabilities Group, and established defined capability programs with clear accountabilities for Program Sponsors and Capability Managers.  

“This has provided the organisational framework to allow us to really progress the development of Joint capabilities. Behaviours have also evolved, and I have witnessed a shared purpose when it comes to the progression of Joint capabilities. 

“For example, as sponsor of the Joint EW Program, I am invited to attend the Program Steering Groups of other relevant Programs, such as the Land ISREW Steering Group, where there is opportunity to listen and to shape and influence outcomes.  

“Equally, my fellow program sponsors are invited to my Joint EW Steering Group. The new structures we’ve got in place, they’re maturing and evolving, but the trend line is very positive, allowing us to collaborate and share routinely.  

“It is also worth noting that there is a realisation that a joint approach makes sense from a value for money perspective. This is particularly the case when it comes to data. Data is not a free commodity, so it makes sense to have, as far as possible, a common approach to EW data.” 

The First Principles Review also saw the creation of the Investment Committee, and that has allowed the capability managers and other stakeholders to review proposed capabilities with a joint mindset.  

“The diligence that goes into preparing those submissions is very thorough and includes detailed collaboration and consultation,” BRIG Beaumont said. “The behaviours and culture that we’re seeing are very positive and I’ve seen a keen eye on achieving value for money and joint capability.  

Just as GPCAPT Lind observed in the Peregrine article, BRIG Beaumont agrees that senior leadership and the political decision makers recognise the importance of these ‘back-end’ joint capabilities that aren’t necessarily hardware or platform-related. 

“I think everyone appreciates the idea of the contemporary operating environment being ‘contested and congested’,” he said in closing. “This is especially the case when it comes to the electromagnetic spectrum.   

“We need to build capabilities that allow us to characterise and understand – as best we can – what is occurring across the spectrum so we can make choices, bringing to reality the idea of electromagnetic spectrum operations and manoeuvre.”