In June 2018 the Commonwealth announced that nine new frigates, based on the BAE Systems UK Type 26 Global Combat Ship (GCS) were to be built for the Royal Australian Navy in South Australia under Project SEA 5000. Rather ambitiously, first steel was to be cut in 2022. 

Ambitious, because this is a brand new design. Work on the first Type 26 for the UK’s Royal Navy only started in July 2018 and, at the time, Australia didn’t have a shipyard suitable for construction of the new vessels. 

But that shipyard is under construction and Craig Lockhart, managing director of ASC Shipbuilding, says they’re right on track to begin prototyping in 2020. And, although he’s not nominating a firm date for a ceremonial button pressing for plasma cutting of a section of steel plate, he predicts it will be around December 2022. 

“From mid to late next year we start really looking at prototyping,” he told ADBR. “We have selected a number of keel blocks and a number of mid-section blocks and we have picked them at levels of different complexity. 

“We are taking the five blocks and intend to run those blocks through the shipyard from a full design reference, to work cards on the shop floor right through to production, as a way of testing the shipyard processes,” he added. “It’s a chance for us to break things. We want to test it in a controlled environment where we are not too worried about getting it wrong.” 

Lockhart says these will be fully finished blocks, but they will not form part of the first ship. “This will be a way of testing the technology transfer, a way of testing the shipyard processes, and a way of testing our readiness, but also it gives the supply chain a much earlier engagement,” he said. 

WORLD CLASS 

For that to occur a shipyard is needed, and construction of the new $500 million facility is well underway at Osborne, where Collins class submarines and Hobart class DDGs were built, and where the first two SEA 1180 offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) are now under construction.  

Once completed, this will be the most modern shipyard in the world, and Lockhart said those building Type 26s for the Royal Navy at historic yards in Glasgow were deeply envious of the new facilities  

“For the first time, Australia has invested in a tailored and unique ship build facility, where raw materials come in one side, straight into the unit build hall where panel lines and plasma cutters will start to shape sheet metal and build units,” Lockhart said. 

“The units will then transfer into the block build hall and be created into blocks. Then assembled blocks will go into the assembly hall where we will have the capability to bring two ships alive at once.” 

That’s different to how the three SEA 4000 AWDs were built. Hull blocks were constructed at Forgacs in Newcastle, BAE Systems at Williamstown, and by ASC at Osborne. They were then assembled into complete ships and fitted out in Osborne.  

Construction of all the Hunter class hull sections at Osborne means the work isn’t shared around as much to others, but the supply chain will still have significant opportunities to participate.  

On the plus side, building everything in the same locations requires less concentration on “dimensional control policies,” one of many issues which plagued the AWD program where blocks manufactured in different yards didn’t always fit together. 

The AWD project, now all but completed, encountered numerous problems and ran late and over budget. Only towards the end and after major reforms which brought ship designer Navantia fully into the build process, did this project demonstrate productivity approaching world standards. 

Lockhart says although they’re building a new design in a new shipyard, they aren’t starting with a completely clean sheet. “There has certainly been a proper and good discussion in the contract negotiations referencing learning from the AWD program. That’s a very positive thing to do,” he said. “We accept that we will learn lessons from AWD.” 

GOING GLOBAL 

Last year was a very good year for BAE Systems and its Global Combat Ship design. First Australia chose the UK design to eventually replace the RAN’s eight ANZAC frigates with nine new vessels. 

Soon after construction of the first of eight ships for the RN began in July. Then in October, Canada announced it had chosen the GCS as its new Canadian Surface Combatant, with 15 to be constructed in partnership with Lockheed Martin in Canada.  

That makes a global fleet of 32 warships and, as success begets success, there could well be more than these three programs. New Zealand will soon need to replace its two ANZAC frigates, the second and fourth of the 10 ANZACs constructed at Williamstown between 1993 and 2006. 

The New Zealand Defence White Paper forecast that the two ships would remain in service to around 2030, so they would have to start considering replacements around 2023-24. 

So could Australian-made Hunters be exported? 

“While construction on the first of the UK’s City class Type 26 ships gathers pace, we are confident that the Global Combat Ship has further potential for export and would be a strong candidate should there be future international competitions for a class of anti-submarine warship.” Lockhart said.  

“The challenge for ASC shipbuilding and the Australian government is to make sure we deliver against the Hunter program (schedule), and the Type 26 program and that track record will stand for itself.” 

The Commonwealth signed the head contract with BAE Systems Australia last December. But even before that, in October BAE signed an Advanced Work Arrangement to allow preliminary processes to begin. 

In July 2019, the project passed its first major milestone, the Systems Readiness Review (SRR) in which ASC Shipbuilding, BAE Systems UK, and the Commonwealth assessed design maturity. 

“We are being paid against a set of design milestone we have agreed with the Commonwealth,” Lockhart said. “We are working in a collaborative way to achieve them and SRR was one of those first steps and that’s why I am confident in saying we are bang on schedule.”  

BAE Systems Australia already has around 400 people employed in the Hunter program, split around between Australia and the UK. 

“We have about 40 Australians living in Glasgow and fully integrated not only with the mobilisation aspects of Hunter, but getting heavily involved in the detailed design and construction of Type 26,” Lockhart said. 

“They are learning how the reference ship is coming together and are compiling the technology transfer,” he added. “We have a couple of hundred people in Adelaide and in Melbourne who are bringing the early design phase together with the customer. We are bang on schedule. We are where we should be at this point in a complex warship design and build program.” 

DIGITAL SHIPS 

The Hunters will the first Australian warship designed and constructed to a wholly digital design. 

That gives unprecedented opportunity for design changes to be instantly standardised between the UK and Australia, for integration of new or different features, for tracking of every production item, and for maintaining integrity for key design criteria such as the noise and vibration quota, vital for an anti-submarine warfare platform. 

However, Hunter will be different from Type 26 in key areas. Australia has mandated the Australian CEA phased array radar, Lockheed Martin Aegis combat system and the SAAB Australian Tactical Interface. 

But on the UK’s ships, the key sensor will be the BAE Systems Type 997 Artisan radar. Both designs feature the US Mark 41 vertical launch system, but different weapons. Hunter will be armed with US ESSM and SM-2 missiles, while Type 26 with the European MBDA SeaCeptor. 

The Canadian vessels will be different again. The prime contractor is Irving Shipbuilding which awarded the contract to Lockheed Martin Canada. The key system will be the Canadian Combat Management System 330, which includes elements of the Saab 9LV, based on the system aboard Canada’s modernised Halifax-class frigates.. 

For Australia, the CEA radar and Aegis/Saab combat system drives considerable change in the ship design. “It is a bigger radar, it uses more power,” explained Lockhart. “That gives us a challenge of how we configure it inside. Obviously we have the US Aegis combat system which different from the UK. 

“Between Lockheed Martin and Saab, our two partners, we have a busy time in the combat management space identifying how we integrate Aegis, the depth of the Australian interface, and how that integrates with the rest of the ship.” 

There are other changes which fall under the general heading of design Australianisation, for example while the RN doesn’t see a collision alarm as necessary, the RAN does. 

Then there’s configuration of the ops room, including screen layouts and who sits where. The hangar deck layout will be different as Australia operates different helicopters. Power outlets will of course be Australian not UK standard. 

However, much will be the same – the hull, powerplant and ship management system. “We are trying not to limit change,” Lockhart said. “The Lloyds certification for a class of ship in the UK is broadly the same as the Lloyds classification for a ship in Australia. 

“Where it has that classification and acceptance standard, we will not seek to change, and we are not pursuing the Australian defcon standard if Type 26 has an approved Naval Standard as the reference design,” he added.  

“But we are building new processes as we go through in terms of how we manage the design review between us. That is a challenge for everyone. We have two teams working with different systems knowledge and different experience, but we are bringing them together and making it work.” 

INSPIRED 

Less than six months passed between the Commonwealth’s June announcement that BAE’s design was the winner to contract signature in December. That’s a remarkably short period for a project of this size, duration, and complexity, and contrasts with the protracted period of negotiations with Naval Group for design and construction of the SEA 1000 Attack class submarines. 

For the Hunters, the Commonwealth has actually contracted with ASC Shipbuilding, previously a division of the Commonwealth-owned ASC. Under the deal with BAE Systems Australia, ASC Shipbuilding structurally separated from ASC and became a subsidiary of BAE Systems Australia, with the Commonwealth retaining an interest. 

To build the Hunters, a workforce will be needed and that has greatly diminished from the peak of the AWD project, courtesy of the ‘Valley of Death’ – as the work has wound down, there’s been no alternative but to lay off skilled workers. 

Right now, the only shipbuilding under way at Osborne is residual work on the AWDs and construction by ASC Shipbuilding of the first two new Arafura class OPVs. With completion of the two Arafuras, the South Australian component of SEA 1180 ends next year after which the project relocates to Henderson in Western Australia. 

The government’s decision to split the OPV build between SA and WA was initially criticised as a clunky solution to the workforce problem, one which would just add cost and complexity. When that occurs, ASC Shipbuilding will get its workers back just in time for the Hunter prototyping phase. 

So now that decision is actually starting to look pretty inspired. The 100 workers engaged on the OPV project actually hold Australia’s most recent actual shipbuilding experience across a range of skills including design, fabrication, and supply chain management. 

At the peak, the Hunter program will engage 2,400 employees, and will create and sustain more than 5,000 jobs throughout BAE Systems, ASC Shipbuilding and the defence industry supply chain.  

Lockhart said, as the project proceeded it would become tougher to find those with the required engineering and systems skills. “It is part of the challenge to develop that skill base over the long term,” he said. “We are on target. We are doing really well but we have got to move from just being what I would call a South Australian focus to a truly national focus. 

“We are tapping into and having good conversation with lots of universities and lots of TAFEs from Western Australian to NSW to Victoria in an attempt to get them aligned to our needs. 

“Realistically we are going to have kids who have not yet started school hopefully work at some point on this program. Getting them turned on to the STEM agenda is a big issue for us because I have to think about the next 20 years worth of capability.” 

This is a long recognised challenge and not just for defence industry, but Lockhart says the situation is definitely improving.  

“Not only is the number improving but the mix is improving,” he said. “We are seeing many more female students interested in science and engineering subjects and we can measure that through our graduate intake.” 

STRATEGY 

At the end of the project, Australia will gain nine very advanced warships, but building new warships for Australia is just part of the government’s plan. The over-arching ambition is to develop a sovereign shipbuilding capability, with the ability to design and build our own ships. 

For that Australia needs a Naval Shipbuilding Strategy which is now under development. “I have just reviewed the first draft,” Lockhart said. “We are in early discussions with the customer on what that looks like. That will set the future program for decades to come. 

“How we bring it alive is the detailed naval shipbuilding strategy itself,” he added. “It started with a series of questions. We converted that into something we refer to as a definition document. 

“It is the early stages of being able to develop that with the customer, which sets up long-term decision – how many ships, to what drumbeat, to what standard, and to what technology are we going to try to build to, and even considering how we fully develop Australian industrial capability. 

“By the end of this decade, we need to be a in a position as a sovereign nation to be able to undertake concept design, scheme designs and full detail designs with the capability we have available on these shores. 

So what if Australia decided it needed a new type of vessel such as an aircraft carrier? Lockhart said that would start with concept designs. “We would then work with the government on systems definition and requirements. If we got agreement that met the capability requirement, we would then have a contract that went into full scheme and detailed design development,” he said. 

“It’s about having the processes, the system, the tools and the know-how on how to do that and bring it alive,” he added. “That’s a big part of this contract – to transfer that knowledge – 100 years worth of shipbuilding knowledge in BAE Systems on the Clyde, and bring it alive over here.” 

SUPPLY CHAIN 

But BAE Systems and ASC Shipbuilding aren’t doing the Hunters on their own. Many other Australian firms will be involved in the supply chain. Already seven Australian firms are supplying equipment for Type 26 in the UK. 

In June ASC and BAE Systems hosted their supply chain conference with some 170 suppliers. In July, a get together of industry, research centres and universities showcased future innovation and technology for the Hunter project. 

“The good thing is when we do events like the (showcase) and the supply chain conference…for ourselves as prime contractors, we get to find out things we didn’t know existed in the SME market,” Lockhart said. “There’s lots of innovation in companies, doing really good stuff that we are just not aware of. Even at the basic level, connecting company A with company B has been a valuable exercise.” 

Right now ASC Shipbuilding is working with 10 primary equipment suppliers. These include companies such as Rolls-Royce which produces the MT30 gas turbines for Type 26 in the UK. And Rolls-Royce owns MTU which manufactures the ship’s diesel engines. 

Could this type of equipment be made in Australia? “Some of those suppliers, like Rolls-Royce are looking at this as a 20 to 30 year program and looking to make that commitment and investment either to initially licence, but then ultimately to manufacture out of Australia,” Lockhart said. 

Many other Australian companies are interested in this project, unsurprising as it’s worth $36 billion and will run for decades. That includes four Australian indigenous-run companies, with ASC Shipbuilding working with the Indigenous Defence and Infrastructure Consortium (IDIC) to get them on board. 

ASC Shipbuilding sees the Australian industry community in three categories; those firms ready to work on the Hunter project right now, those which could be ready with some help and guidance on contracting procedures, and those which have some interesting capabilities but don’t yet make the grade. 

“But we are going to give them some help to move them down that journey,” he said.  

This feature appeared in the September-October 2019 issue of ADBR

The Commonwealth has announced the selection of the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) MQ-9B Sky Guardian as its preferred version of the Predator B for the RAAF’s Project AIR 7003 medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) armed remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS) requirement.

The Sky Guardian was previously marketed as the Certified Predator-B, and forms the basis of the Protector RG Mk1 system being acquired for the UK’s Royal Air Force. The ADF selected the certified Sky Guardian over the similar GA-ASI MQ-9 Reaper Block 5 model which is common to that being acquired by the USAF.

“Cutting-edge technology of this kind, with advanced sensors and systems, would complement advanced aircraft such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and ensure that ADF maintains state-of-the-art capability,” Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds said in a statement.

The Sky Guardian will be certified so that it may operate in controlled airspace, an important capability for remotely piloted vehicles in proximity to civil air traffic. To this end, GA-ASI is developing a ‘detect-and-avoid’ radar for the UK’s Protector program which will also be incorporated onto the Sky Guardian. The Reaper does not have a detect-and-avoid sensor, and is not intended to be certified.

The long-awaited announcement comes more than a year after the November 2018 Gate 1 announcement for AIR 7003, where the Sky Guardian and the Reaper were shortlisted. The Gate 1 announcement itself came more than two years after Gate 0, and more than 18 months after the originally planned 2017 Avalon Airshow Gate 1 announcement was cancelled at the last moment following intense lobbying and a renewed effort by Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) to pitch its rival Heron TP system.

No indication of in-service, initial operational capability (IOC) or final operational capability (FOC) timelines were given in the latest announcement, nor was the number of systems to be acquired mentioned. The 2016 Defence White Paper and Integrated Investment Plan indicated between 12 and 16 systems would be acquired.

ADF air vehicle operators have been training and operating on exchange with USAF operational Reaper units at Creech AFB and Holloman AFB in the US since February 2015.

The RAAF retired its first unmanned system – the IAI Heron I – in 2017. The RAAF leased three Herons from Canadian company MDA in late 2009 under Project Nankeen to meet an urgent operational requirement to provide surveillance support to Australian and coalition troops in Afghanistan, and these were withdrawn to Australia in 2014.

The armed MALE capability will be co-located at RAAF Edinburgh near Adelaide with other key ADF ISR assets such as the P-8A Poseidon, the Project AIR 7000 Phase 1B MQ-4C Triton high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) maritime ISR, the AIR 555 MC-55A Peregrine electronic warfare support aircraft, and the AIR 3503 Distributed Ground Station (DGS-AUS) intelligence unit which is responsible for the analysis of data collected from the various RAAF ISR platforms.

But while the ground control segment, support and sustainment force, and training facilities will be located at Edinburgh, it is yet to be determined whether the MQ-9B air vehicles will actually be based at Edinburgh or, more likely, at a remote location such as Woomera.

The ministerial statement said the next phase of the project will ‘focus on developing the MQ-9B acquisition proposal, which is scheduled for government consideration in 2021-22’. Quite what this statement means is unclear – it could be the definition of what sensors, weapons and other systems the RAAF’s Sky Guardian will carry, or it could be the progression to contract signature with GA-ASI…or both.

The UK’s Protector RG Mk1 will feature sensors and communications systems of European origin so that it may better integrate with other systems in service in that region. Australia will likely have a requirement for its Sky Guardians to integrate sensors and other systems that are more interoperable with those operated by the US and other Indo-Pacific regional partners.

To this end, GA-ASI has assembled a comprehensive group of Australian industry members to not only sustain the system in service, but to develop and integrate Australian-specific capabilities for the system.

“Local companies that provide a range of innovative sensor, communication, manufacturing and life-cycle support capabilities will have the opportunity to showcase their capabilities throughout this development process,” Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price said in a statement. “Australian defence industries are world-class and are extremely well-placed to be involved in projects like this.”

Announced in 2017, ‘Team Reaper’ comprises GA-ASI, Cobham, CAE Australia, Raytheon Australia, Flight Data Systems, TAE Aerospace, Rockwell Collins, Ultra Electronics Australia, Airspeed, and Quickstep Holdings Ltd.

Chief of Air Force AIRMSHL Mel Hupfeld and CASG’s Head of Aerospace Systems Division (HASD) AVM Greg Hoffman have told a Senate Estimates hearing on November 29 that Australia will not receive any compensation for an RAAF EA-18G Growler which was destroyed on takeoff from Nellis AFB in Nevada in January 2018.

The aircraft was departing Nellis AFB at the start of a Red Flag familiarisation mission on January 27 2018 when a high pressure turbine disk in one of its engines fractured and disintegrated, and the engine and rear fuselage caught fire.

Despite approaching takeoff speed, the crew was able to keep the aircraft on the ground. It came to rest just off Nellis’ eastern runway, and the crew safely evacuated the aircraft. Nellis fire crews were quickly on the scene, but the aircraft was later declared a write-off due to the extensive fire and structural damage around the rear fuselage and landing gear.

Reports indicate the disk had broken into three major pieces, one of which went sideways through the other engine and landed on an adjoining aircraft parking ramp, one went upwards and destroyed the starboard vertical stabiliser, and one went down and damaged the the runway.

The Growler was nearly new with less than 200 hours on it. Despite being so early in the fleet’s service life, it is unlikely the RAAF will seek to replace the aircraft, and it will likely be considered part of an acceptable rate of attrition which would have been a factor when the original order for 12 EA-18Gs was placed.

At the time of the confirmation of the write-off, Defence said it “is exploring options for the recovery of economic losses resulting from the incident.” The RAAF had hoped it would receive some compensation for the loss of the aircraft from engine manufacturer General Electric, from prime contractor Boeing, or from the US Navy as the foreign military sales (FMS) authority.

The US Department of Defense reached a US$34bn (A$50bn) agreement with Lockheed Martin in October for 478 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters over three production lots.

The deal was reached in late October, and covers a total 351 F-35As, 86 F-35Bs, and 41 F-35Cs for operators including the USAF, US Navy, USMC, Norway, Italy, and Australia. Of that total, 291 F-35s are for the US services, 127 for JSF program partner nations, and 60 are for foreign military sales (FMS) customers.

The multi-year agreement covers production Lots 12, 13 and 14. Despite the large numbers, these production lots are still considered to be low-rate initial production (LRIP), as the JSF program is yet to receive the all-important Milestone C approval to progress to multi-year full-rate production.

Australia will receive 15 aircraft from each of the three production lots for a total of 45 jets, and these will be delivered from 2020 to 2022. These aircraft will add to the 18 RAAF F-35As already in service at Luke AFB in Arizona, and at RAAF Williamtown. The RAAF’s final nine F-35As are due to be delivered in 2023 from Lot 15 which is yet to be negotiated.

Due to the complex nature of US contracting which includes government furnished equipment (GFE) and the prior commitment of funding for long-lead production items such as titanium and other components, many of the lot 12 aircraft are already in advanced stages of production, and it is difficult to ascertain the final cost of each aircraft.

But US undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, Ellen Lord said the program had reached its target price of US$80m for the F-35A. “We will reach a unit recurring flyaway cost-per-aircraft target of (US)$80 million for a US Air Force F-35A price, by Lot 13 — which is one lot earlier than planned,” she said in an October 29 statement. “A significant milestone for the department.”

JSF program executive LtGen. Eric Fick added, “With this award we see from a production perspective the most dramatic rate increases in the production line are now behind us. This dramatic production rate increase has proven to be challenging for the supply chain, but the comparatively minor quantity changes across lots 12 through 14 should give it some breathing room as we move forward.”

Because Australia is a partner nation on the JSF program and our aircraft are identical to US F-35As, its prices will be the same as those paid by the USAF. According to a Lockheed Martin statement, the prices for each aircraft in each lot are as follows:

Lot 12: F-35A US$82.4m (A$122m), F-35B US$108m (A$159.5m), F-35C $US103.1m (A$152.3m)

Lot 13: F-35A US$79.2m (A$117m), F-35B US$104.8m (A$155m), F-35C $US98.1m (A$145m)

Lot 14: F-35A US$77.9m (A$115.1m), F-35B US$101.3m (A$149.7m), F-35C $US94.4m (A$139.5m)

Taking these figures into account, Australia’s 45 F-35As from these three Lots should cost US$3.592bn (A$5.31bn).

“Driving down cost is critical to the success of this program,” LtGen Fick added. “I am excited that the F-35 Joint Program Office and Lockheed Martin have agreed on this landmark three-lot deal. This agreement achieves an average 12.7 percent cost reduction across all three variants…This $34 billion agreement is a truly historic milestone for the F-35 Enterprise.”

Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds has announced Australia and Japan will forge closer defence ties following a visit to Tokyo for bilateral discussions with her equivalent, Mr Kono Taro.

In a November 20 ministerial release Senator Reynolds said, as Indo-Pacific security dynamics became more challenging, the strategic logic underpinning Japan-Australia cooperation was only getting stronger. To this end, elements from both countries will participate in large scale multi-national and bilateral exercises, and will increase personnel exchanges, joint space and cyber policy, and defence science technology.

The exercises will include a new bilateral fighter jet exercise called BUSHIDO GUARDIAN in Japan, while Japan will participate in the biennial Exercise TALISMAN SABER in Queensland. The Japan Air Self Defence Force will also participate in the biennial Exercise PITCH BLACK in the Northern Territory.

Exchange postings will include an Australian Army liaison officer in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force to further enhance cooperation and deepen interoperability, while a program will be established to exchange defence scientists and engineers between Japan`s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, and Australia`s Defence Science and Technology (DST) Group.

The deployment of an RAAF P-8A Poseidon maritime ISR aircraft to the Middle East has concluded.

The aircraft was deployed under the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) in September in response to the June shoot-down of a US Navy RQ-4A Global Hawk UAS by Iran, and subsequent Iranian attacks on commercial shipping near the Straits of Hormuz.

“Over the last month, the P-8A Poseidon aircraft has provided valuable maritime surveillance and reconnaissance to support the coalition partners in the IMSC,” Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds said in a November 24 statement. “It is now time for the Poseidon to return home, having played a key role in supporting freedom of navigation and the free flow of shipping, which is crucial to regional security and stability.”

During the deployment, the aircraft completed 12 missions and flew for about 100 hours. Also deployed to Australia’s main operating base at Al Minhad AB in UAE was an E-7A Wedgetail, a C-130J Hercules, a KC-30A, and a visiting C-17A (pictured below).

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) signed an agreement of intent on November 30 to support the Australian Air Force Cadets’ (AAFC) ‘Pathways to an Aerospace Future’ program in 2020.

The AAFC Pathways program, overseen by the AAFC Foundation on behalf of the AAFC, seeks to provide opportunities and experiences for cadets with a desire for a career or connection within the civil and military aerospace industries to help that become a reality.

Signing the agreement with AAFC Foundation Chair AVM Kym Osley following the Canberra based AAFC units’ annual parade at the Burgmann Anglican School Forde Campus, ATSB Chief Commissioner Greg Hood said the Bureau intends to provide opportunities and access that supports four of the program’s six pillars.

“There are around 8,000 young people in the AAFC nationally because they have a keen interest in aerospace,” Mr Hood said. “Many of them aspire to a career in the industry, and the ATSB is delighted to support the program and offer cadets opportunities focusing on leadership and personal development; technology and innovation; pathways to an aerospace career; and aerospace experiences.”

During a number of planned visits to the ATSB’s offices next year, cadets will learn about the role of the ATSB and how the agency works to improve safety for the travelling public, and will be given an overview of career opportunities at the ATSB and the entry requirements.

Both Greg Hood and AVM Osley are former Air Training Corps cadets, and several ATSB staff and family members are also either current or former members of the AAFC.

The RAAF’s 49^th and final Pilatus PC-21 advanced trainer has arrived in Australia and was handed over in a ceremony at RAAF East Sale in Victoria on December 6.

The PC-21s are being delivered to the RAAF under the Project AIR 5428 Pilot Training Systems (PTS), and will replace the Pilatus PC-9/A in service as the ADF’s advanced fixed-wing training aircraft.

The first two aircraft arrived in Australia in March 2017, and entered service in August 2017. The final PC-21 was accepted by the Head of Air Force Capability AVM Cath Roberts (above), and the Minister for Veterans and Defence Personnel and local member for Gippsland, Darren Chester.

“Undergraduate pilots at RAAF East Sale and Pearce will now be able to use the best equipment along with a new tailored Pilot Training System, which will meet their needs and those of future recruits,” Mr Chester said in a statement. “The new system can train more people faster and to a higher standard, and will ensure undergraduate pilots develop the necessary skills before moving to more advanced military aircraft.

“From early 2020, the PC-21 will also be used for flight test and evaluation at RAAF Base Edinburgh and forward air control at RAAF Base Williamtown.”

The forward air control role is performed by 4SQN at RAAF Williamtown, and its four PC-21s will be painted in a grey livery. The PC-21 will also be flown by The Roulettes display team and, as with the previous PC-9/A, all aircraft based at the Central Flying School (CFS) at East Sale have been painted in The Roulettes’ livery.

The final PC-21’s arrival and acceptance coincided with the December 5 conclusion of the final PC-9/A Advanced Pilots Training ‘Wings’ course at 2FTS at RAAF Pearce near Perth. The PC-9/A entered service with the ADF in 1988, and has trained thousands of ADF aircrew from all three services.

The RAAF’s No 2 Operational Conversion Unit (2OCU) completed 35 years of operations with the F/A-18A/B ‘classic’ Hornet on December 11.

Tasked with converting pilots to and upgrading pilot qualifications on the Hornet, 2OCU was the RAAF’s first Hornet unit and, until recently had trained every RAAF fighter pilot since 1986. The squadron graduated its last group of Hornet pilots with the return of the graduating class from Exercise High Sierra to RAAF Williamtown on December 4, and flew its final Hornet flight as a 10-ship formation in the shape of a ‘2’ around the Newcastle and Port Stephens region on December 11.

“2OCU’s critical role in preparing generations of classic Hornet fighter aircrew with the skills and competency to engage in fighter combat has laid the very foundations of RAAF Air Power capability since the introduction of the platform in 1985,” outgoing commanding officer (CO) of 2OCU, WGCDR Scott Woodland said in a statement.

“Operational conversion has been at the cornerstone of the strength of the classic Hornet platform’s contribution – taking graduate Hawk 127 lead-in fighter pilots and testing and challenging them under the most gruelling of conditions and toughest air combat scenarios,” he added. “The result has been the delivery of highly-trained, focused personnel to frontline squadrons, performing with excellence at home and abroad on operations in defence of our national interests.”

Coincidentally, just two hours after 2OCU’s last Hornet sortie, a ferry flight of seven RAAF F-35As arrived from the US (a year and a day after the first RAAF F-35As arrived), including three aircraft wearing 2OCU livery.

The latest ferry was led by CO 3SQN WGCDR Darren Clare and CO 2OCU-designate WGCDR Jordan Sander, and comprised five aircraft that have been withdrawn from the multi-national F-35A ‘schoolhouse’ run by the USAF’s 61^st Fighter Squadron at Luke AFB in Arizona, and two freshly-delivered aircraft. Five RAAF F-35As are scheduled to remain at Luke until the end of 2020.

The seven aircraft flew to Williamtown from Luke via overnight stops at Hickam AFB in Hawai’i and Anderson AFB in Guam, and were supported by two RAAF KC-30A MRTTs.

The seven new aircraft add to the six F-35As already in service with 3SQN at Williamtown, giving almost a full squadron worth of aircraft to ramp up the all-important Australian-specific validation and verification of the jet’s capabilities, and the in-country pilot and engineering training effort.

“We welcome the commencement of the next phase of pilot conversion training for the F-35A,” WGCDR Woodland added. “This represents a fundamental shift for 2OCU; one which we are fully equipped and ready to continue to deliver a superior war-fighting capability – supported by highly professional, highly skilled aircrew – performing with strength and focus when called upon by government.”

The classic Hornet has about two years left in RAAF service, with Williamtown-based 77SQN scheduled to transition to the F-35A in late 2020, and Tindal’s 75SQN to follow the following year. Several classic Hornets have already been retired and parked-up at Williamtown, while at least three of a planned 25 jets have been transferred to Canada to bolster the RCAF’s CF-18 Hornet fleet until replaced in the late 2020s.

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) released its 2018-2019 Major Projects Report (MPR) on December 16.

Covering the 2018/109 financial year, the MPR reviews the status of selected major defence equipment acquisition projects for that period.

‘Major defence equipment acquisition projects continue to be the subject of parliamentary and public interest,’ the MPR summary reads. ‘This is due to their high cost and contribution to national security, and the challenges involved in completing them within the specified budget and schedule, and to the required capability.

‘The MPR reviews overall issues, risks, challenges and complexities affecting major projects and also reviews the status of each of the selected major projects, in terms of cost, schedule and forecast capability. The objective of the report is ‘to improve the accountability and transparency of Defence acquisitions for the benefit of Parliament and other stakeholders’.’

‘Major projects are selected for review based on the criteria included in the 2018–19 Major Projects Report Guidelines, as endorsed by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA),’ the MPR reads. ‘They represent a selection of the most significant major projects managed by Defence. The total approved budget for the major projects included in this report is approximately $64.1 billion, covering 49 per cent of the total budget of active major and minor capital equipment projects of $132 billion.’

A total of 26 projects were reviewed by the MPR, ranging in value from the $236.7 million Project JP 2018 Phase 3 amphibious watercraft replacement, to the $16.52 billion Project AIR 6000 Phase 2A/2B New Air Combat Capability (F-35A). This compares to 26 projects totalling $59.6 billion reviewed in the 2017-2018 MPR, and 27 projects valued at $62.0 billion in the 2016-2017 MPR.

Of this year’s 26 projects, 22 of them appeared in the 2018-2018 MPR. Compared to the previous report, there is a $1.225 billion, or 2.1% variation in the approved budgets for these projects, much of which can be attributed to long-term projects such as AIR 6000’s exposure to exchange rate variations.

More concerning was Defence’s continuing inability to spend its total approved budget. From an initial Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) forecast expenditure of $5.8094 billion, a mid-year Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements (PAES) forecast of $5.3823 billion, and a final forecast of $5.173 billion, Defence was only able to spend $4.8314 billion.

The bulk of this underspend was seen in the Project SEA 4000 Hobart class air warfare destroyer and Project AIR 7000 Phase 2 P-8A Poseidon programs where there was a variance in deferred planned expenditure to subsequent years and deferred payment of invoices incurred during the year; and in the Project Land 121 Phase 4 PMV-L Hawkei program due to ‘ongoing vehicle reliability issues, design maturity, and delays in the delivery of engine components delaying payment of milestones’.

Also troubling is the forecast slippage of final operational capability (FOC) milestones compared to initial predictions when they were approved by government. For the 26 projects in the MPR, 21 have experienced schedule slippage which, to date, totals a staggering 691 months (or 57.6 years). This is actually an improvement on the 2017-2018 MPR which showed a total slippage of 801 months, but is attributable to the exit of previously troubled projects from the MPR.

Topping the list of projects that have experienced the most slippage is the Project SEA 1439 Phase 3 Collins class reliability and sustainability program with 112 months, the Project AIR 9000 Phase 2/4/6 battlefield helicopter MRH 90 which has experienced an 89 month slippage, the SEA 1448 Phase 2B ANZAC ASMD with 77 months.

The MPR provides one explanation of the slippage; ‘A closer examination of the reasons for schedule slippage demonstrates the importance of initial assessments of project complexity,’ it reads. ‘A key factor is whether a project is MOTS (military off-the-shelf), Australianised MOTS, or developmental. One project, (AIR 9000 Phases 2/4/6) MRH90 Helicopters113, was originally misclassified as MOTS. The project was reclassified by Defence to Australianised MOTS (i.e. more developmental) subsequent to Second Pass Approval’.

A footnote says the Project AIR 87 Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) is another example of a project being reclassified as being more developmental.

Other FOC variances were the result of changes to the FOC definition due to capability enhancements, delays in related projects, administrative processes, delays to security requirements, and delays to final operational test and evaluation trials.

The complete ANAO 2018-2019 MPR can be viewed here.

The RAAF builds up its initial cadre of F-35 pilots and sustainment personnel at Luke AFB

Phoenix Arizona is hot, damn hot! It wasn’t even noon yet, but my rental car’s temp gauge was already reading 118 degrees, or 48C. And while the Arizona desert is usually dry, on this July day storm clouds sat on the surrounding mountains and I was gasping for breath as the humidity of the two month-long “monsoon” took hold of the day and squeezed the oxygen out of it.

‘Who the hell would want to build an air force base – let alone America’s fifth largest city – in such an inhospitable and debilitating environment?’, I wondered as I drove from the airport along the elevated freeway above the treeless concrete jungle to my hotel.

Luke Air Force Base is located on the western fringes of Phoenix, and is a hive of activity as F-35 production ramps up, US, JSF partner nations and FMS customer units move in, and facilities are upgraded.

The RAAF now has a growing detachment of 10 F-35As and nearly 50 personnel based at Luke AFB including about a dozen pilots, some of whom are embedded with the USAF’s 61st Fighter Squadron (FS) at the multi-national Pilot Training Center (PTC).

RAAF pilots and maintainers learn to fly and maintain the F-35 at the PTC and the 61st FS, and they then instruct other trainees on it. The RAAF’s PTC detachment is led by WGCDR Jordon Sander (who took over as CO of 2OCU at Williamtown in December 2019.)

AIRWORTHINESS

The 3SQN detachment was spun off from the larger 61st FS as a stand-alone entity in mid-September after the unit successfully passed a key airworthiness board milestone in August which authorised it to operate the F-35A on Australia’s own maintenance and airworthiness systems.

Prior to this, all of the RAAF’s F-35 operations at Luke were conducted under a Chief of Air Force directive that allowed them to operate within the US construct, which meant all maintenance was overseen by Lockheed Martin in accordance with US procedures.

“What the airworthiness board has now allowed is for maintenance to be done under Australian rules and procedures which our guys had been writing for over a year,” CO 3SQN WGCDR Darren Clare told ADBR. “All those standing instructions for us to fly under an Australian authorisation, that was a big milestone that everyone had been working towards for a long time.”

Following the airworthiness board, 3SQN took delivery of the RAAF’s 9th and 10th F-35As from Lockheed Martin in late August and early September (2018), and these aircraft were placed straight onto the RAAF’s airworthiness system. The other eight aircraft that were previously delivered will stay on the 61st FS’s flight line under the US system until they are transferred to RAAF operational units after 2019.

The Australian systems differs from those of the US in that most of the RAAF’s maintenance staff are trained on multiple trades on the aircraft, whereas the USAF tends to have more people that specialise on specific trades and rarely deviate from these.

“All of our maintainers do what we call ‘nose to tail maintenance’ or ‘grey trades’,” explained WGCDR Clare. “Any one of them can do any job in the Joint Technical Documentation (JTD) – we do not necessarily have an avionics subject matter expert to do an avionics job, or a ‘black-hander’ to do an engine job, or a surface-finisher to do that job. Anyone can pretty much do anything. There are still subject matter experts, but our system gives the maintenance manager a lot more flexibility in the team they can send out.”

Another key difference is the USAF crew chief model where he or she will stand near the nose of the aircraft during start-up, while technicians run around and under the aircraft doing various checks. In that scenario, the F-35 pilot has to request permission from the crew chief to move the control surfaces and to run up the engine in case a crew member is under the aircraft.

“The crew chief owns the aircraft,” said WGCDR Clare. “As a pilot, it’s very different in that I’ll have people running around my airplane with the engine running and I want to move the flight controls, but I can’t because there might be someone under my airplane that I don’t know about. That’s just their way of doing business.”

While RAAF also assign ground personnel to stand near and control the area immediately around the aircraft, the pilot has to give permission for crew members to move around under the aircraft.

“That said,” said WGCDR Clare, “the Lightning Initiative Teams here at the 62nd FS have come and had a look at the way we’re doing things and have gone away saying, ‘let’s see if everyone can do everything the way the Aussies are doing it’.”

Other points of difference are the RAAF’s different workplace health and safety (WHS) rules, particularly in regard to closed space entries. “We’ve invested in equipment to ensure we meet Australia’s stringent WHS requirements where required. Where appropriate we’ve been granted waivers and that’s been part of the airworthiness board process.”

MATESHIP

Since the first members of the RAAF cadre arrived at Luke AFB in 2014, they’ve built a close relationship with their USAF 61st FS hosts and the Lockheed Martin contract support team.

“In 1918, Number 3 Squadron of the Australian Army Flying Corps was operating out of western France when it flew its ‘Harry Tate’ RE8 aircraft, and successfully dropped ammunition supplies at low level to both Australian and American forces in the Battle of Hamel,” Australia’s Air Attaché to the US, AIRCDRE Terry Van Haren said at a November 9 (2018) event hosted by the Australian element to recognise the relationship. “From that moment one hundred years ago, a strong friendship was formed. A friendship more fondly referred to as a ‘mateship’.”

“It’s a friendship that’s formed under difficult circumstances,” WGCDR Clare said at the event. “We’re there for each other in the good times and bad. Australia has been fighting alongside the US in every major conflict since World War I. It’s an ongoing and enduring friendship, whereby we rely on each other for support in those times of need.

“In the spirit of the ‘100 Years of Mateship’ campaign, we wanted to say thank you for the support so far to get us to this point,” he added. “It’s not the end. Australia will have a presence here in the 61st FS for a number of years to come, but we appreciate all that you’ve done to get us where we are today.

“It’s been phenomenal. I’ve flown with several USAF pilots in the past and to be here in the Luke community, to be fully embedded within the squadron so tightly and be trusted to train your next generation of F-35 pilots is a pretty big honour. We’ve been supported with whatever we needed on base and achieved a level that we wouldn’t have been able to get to if we just did this on our own.”

During ADBR’s July (2018) visit to Luke, the commander of the 61st FS, LtCol Rhett Heirlmeier told us that the relationship between the two services has been far from one-sided.

“It’s awesome, it’s a great relationship with the Australians,” he said. “They’ve been here from the very beginning as the squadron stood up, and they have joined right in to our air force and the 61st FS organisation and picked up roles just like a US air force pilot would have done. And they’ve battled through all the challenges we’ve had as we’ve tried to stand something up.

“It’s not just turn the key and it runs, you have to put a lot of effort and energy into it,” he added. “And they’ve been through all of those challenges with us. In a lot of ways Australians have shown tenacity in identifying challenges that we might not have been aware of.

“There’s been goodness in seeing things from different perspectives as you blend our two air forces together,” he added. “Obviously everybody does their thing a certain way, but I think there’s a real strength in seeing some differences. I’ve noticed a lot of exchange of ideas in both directions in the way that we teach the students, the way we run operations, and the way we discuss things.

“One of our squadron objectives is to do everything we can to support the Australian stand-up. They get to see how we run operations here, and hopefully can pick the best parts of that and take that with them as they get up and running in Williamtown.”

LtCol Heirlmeier has an impressive resume, having previously flown the Boeing F-15C fighter before moving to the Lockheed Martin F-22 as an operational and then instructor pilot. He has led the 61st FS for nearly 18 months.

“I think I was lucky to have an F-15 experience, from a legacy platform perspective where you really had to work sensors to get information then fuse it up here,” he said as he tapped his head. “To then go into the F-22 and be like, ‘Oh this is great, sensors do all the work for you.’ They fuse the picture and now you’re really just a decision maker. So coming into the F-35, that was the same.

“The flight characteristics of the F-35 are similar in a lot of ways to the F-22,” he added. “With the high angles of attack, it’s very similar performance there. They obviously look similar in a lot of ways, and I think the digital flight control system laws ported over in a large way as well. Plus the way the stick behaves and how it moves the airplane was very intuitive having come from the F-22.”

PILOT TRAINING

The Pilot Training Center at Luke is the model for the RAAF’s Integrated Training Centre (ITC) being established at Williamtown in time for when 2OCU stands up its F-35A capability there in early 2020.

After arriving at Luke in May, WGCDR Jordon Sander had his first flight in the F-35 in August. “I have been flying since I was 16, have over 2,000 hours in the Hornet over the last 17 years, and have instructed on many FCI courses,” he told ADBR.

“Despite all this, there is nothing like a new aircraft type to make you feel like you have never flown before,” he added. “It is the years of muscle-memory that you are fighting or trying to retrain. When you get in a stressful situation your brain defaults to its long-term memory, so for me that is the classic Hornet.”

Because there are no two-seat F-35s, the first flight you have in the jet will be a solo. Therefore, it’s vital that the synthetic training devices and courseware is of sufficiently high fidelity to give a pilot the confidence when they first step into the cockpit.

“I think the F-35A training aids are excellent,” WGCDR Sander said. “You start out with a pilot training aid (PTA) which is a computer with a touchscreen, F-35 stick and throttle. This is great for navigating the many menus and display options – the F-35 has very few switches, with most of the pilot vehicle interface (PVI) occurring through the touchscreen, HOTAS (hands-on throttle & stick), or voice recognition.”

The PTA allows a new pilot to practice their checks and to develop their ‘scan’, and prepares the pilot for the aircraft simulator. “When I got to the sim I felt semi-comfortable,” WGCDR Sander explained. “The sim is like a ride at Disneyland – you climb in the cockpit and then it motors forward into the spherical dome. When you reach the centre of the dome it lifts you up about a metre, and from there you align your helmet and you’re ready to go.”

The simulator part of the course covers general flying, formation flying and air-to-air refuelling. But a large proportion of the sim time is spent doing emergency procedures such as actual and precautionary flameout (FO/PFO) landings.

“The flameout training was a new thing for someone like me who had flown a twin-engined fighter their entire life,” WGCDR Sander said. “When I reflect on my sims, the following stands out – the autopilot is excellent, and I use it much more than the Hornet.

“Overall, the PVI is very intuitive and very well done, the jet also carries a lot of fuel and, if you fly carefully, it will run circles around the Hornet for time on station and combat radius. It is also very easy to land and is very stable, and the flight control system and control laws are first class.”

Because the F-35’s G-suit, jacket, helmet and other ancillary clothing and life-support equipment are all unique to the jet, an IP is assigned to help the trainee pilot suit up and strap into the jet for their first flight.

LtCol Heirlmeier said new F-35 pilots with previous fighter experience will go through a course about four to five months in length. “They do six weeks of academics and simulator events including 12 simulators before the first sortie,” he said. “And then they’ll fly with us through the transition phases before they get some exposure to each of the mission phases. This will culminate with a check which will clear them to fly as a pilot.

“Then we go put them through an instructor upgrade,” he added. “That’s another three-month program where we teach them to teach, at the very basic level, what they just learned to do. So, all in all it’s about seven to eight months to take a previous fighter pilot and turn them into an F-35 instructor pilot who can teach our youngest, most inexperienced pilots.”

New USAF pilots without previous fast-jet experience complete an eight to 10 months conversion. They are then posted to an operational squadron for a tour to become combat-proficient before they can qualify to become instructor pilots.

DIFFERENCES

WGCDR Andrew ‘Jacko’ Jackson, the RAAF’s first F-35A pilot who arrived at Luke via Eglin AFB in 2015, explained some of the key handling differences between the F-35 and the Hornet it is replacing. “Some of the handling qualities would be more Super Hornet than Hornet, so from that perspective it’s very comfortable to transition to, and it feels similar.

“Where it is different, obviously, is the low-observable piece of the puzzle,” he added. “And then the sensors that go along with that and the way that the system ties all that together through fusion – I think in that regard the way you operate the F-35 tactically and how you deal with particular tactical problems is obviously quite different.

“With the classic Hornet it’s a simpler problem to deal with, but the F-35 is very mission data-dependent, so the whole IMD (Intelligence Mission Data) side of it is critical to how we operate the jet.”

The F-35 has a sophisticated mission planning capability which integrates the various environmental and mission-specific data such as weapons, radars, other aircraft and EW systems, all integrated with the F-35’s suite of advanced sensors to generate superior situational awareness.

The F-35 mission data files are scenario-specific data systems which integrate various sources of information about geography, airspace, and potential threats with IMD enabling the characterisation of the all-important threat environment to ensure information advantage over an adversary. 

Jackson said the way the RAAF builds its mission data file in the future will be critical to how successful it will be in a contingency operation. “Getting that stuff right is critical and then that obviously shapes how you interact with the environment,” he said.

“When you’re flying the jet, what you see on your displays, how accurate that information is, and how you then interact with that information and make tactical decisions is all really based around that mission data piece. While that is a component of Hornet, I wouldn’t say it was the critical or the keystone component that it is now.”

While the RAAF has been ramping up its training workforce at Luke, developing the IMD hasn’t been a primary focus. “While our first mission data products have been cut, until we start operating over the far side of the ramp, we’re not going to see what’s really going on there,” Jackson said. “Obviously, Australia is one of the countries that’s invested in the ACURL (the Australia–Canada–United Kingdom Reprogramming Laboratory).

“So the UK is flying with that mission data and we are receiving lessons from them in terms of where they’re at,” he added. “But, obviously we have a long way to go. The US has been building mission data products for F-35 for probably eight years now, so we don’t know what we don’t know to an extent. That will be a key element of our V&V (verification and validation) that we started in September (2018) and will continue in Australia next year.”

The two-year V&V will be the major effort in order to achieve an initial operational capability (IOC), and will validate the F-35’s capabilities in an Australian operational and maintenance environment.

Jackson said the other key difference between the F-35 and older generation jets is the built-in mission flexibility the new jet brings to the fight. “I think one of the other differences with flying the F-35 is, it’s pretty much always a clean jet,” he said. “The performance is considerably better than an aircraft that’s lugging around a bunch of tanks or external weapons.

“We commonly equate some of the performance to a classic Hornet carrying a centreline tank, but even that’s probably not valid. The F-35’s sea level performance in mil power is significantly better than you would see in a classic, and as you get higher up even into the ‘40s’, if you keep the speed on the jet it goes quite well up there compared to a Hornet or Super Hornet.

“But importantly, in terms of the missions that you’re flying you’ve got far more flexibility, because you’re always in a configuration that can do any of the roles. It’s not like I can’t do BFM (basic fighter manoeuvring) that day because my fleet is ‘jugged up’ with (external) tanks, so quite often here we’ll do some BFM on the back end of the mission, whereas historically we wouldn’t have been able to do that.

“Or now we can swing-role into something else, whereas maybe we wouldn’t have had that flexibility in the past because we didn’t have a targeting pod on the jet,” he added. “That creates some scheduling and training flexibility that we didn’t previously have, and it means we’re unencumbered by some of the constraints we have on the classic Hornet.

“So, by nature the way we operate tactically, I can do a lot more mission elements in a single F-35 flight than I could previously, and I can stay competent across a broader range of roles using fewer focussed sorties.

“But in summary, with respect to the F-35’s differences to Hornet or Super Hornet, I think we’re only just starting to scratch the surface,” Jackson said. “The nature of the way that the system interacts with the running air force and ADF system is very different in terms of the support we require from our range infrastructure and our intelligence back end. There’s a whole different psychology to operating the platform that we are only starting to kind of understand.

“In the past we would buy a new fighter, bring it in, and operate a new fighter – it was quite straightforward. The F-35 is like, ‘I’ve bought an Apple product, and now I’ve got to rewire my whole house to be an Apple environment’…we’re kind of in that situation for want of a better analogy.”

MAINTENANCE

SQNLDR Christopher Myles is the Participant Maintenance Liaison (PML) for Australia at Luke AFB, the primary maintenance liaison between the RAAF and the Lockheed Martin/USAF structure under which the aircraft allocated to the 61st FS operate.

“I was on the backend of the HUG (Hornet upgrade program) process for the structural upgrades, and then took that project piece and put it into the sustainment system,” he told ADBR. “From there I went to 78 Wing to look after the Hawks and to oversee the transition from the RAAF maintenance to BAE Systems.

“After that, someone said, ‘you sound like the right man for the job to go to Luke’,” he added. “Each partner country has a PML (Participant Maintenance Liaison) working with Lockheed Martin who provides all of our maintenance on this side of the base.

“I guess I provide an Australian lens over how they do their maintenance,” he said. “They do it in accordance with the consolidated ground operations plan contract, but basically it looks a lot like the USAF maintenance system. The way that the USAF think about maintenance is a bit different to us, but it makes sense – they’re a great big organisation with multiple layers of command structure, not to mention however many thousands of aircraft they have.

“We’re very small and therefore very agile because we have to be,” Myles added. “We tend to, micromanage is not the right term, but it’s in that kind of vein. We really risk-manage a lot of our stuff, whereas because of their system the USAF tend to take a bit of a broader brush, which is totally understandable.”

Myles’ predecessor was SQNLDR Nathan ‘Bullet’ Draper who was subsequently recognised by the US government when he was awarded a Meritorious Service Medal for his significant contribution to the establishment and sustainment of the Australian training, maintenance and engineering effort at Luke.

Draper served as the Australian PML lead at Luke from 2014 until 2017, and played a significant role in establishing the initial RAAF and other partner nations F-35 complements including those from Norway and Italy.

“Bullet got here about mid-2014 to receive ‘Aussie One and Two’ (AU-1 and AU-2) in December that year,” said Myles. “He was the first foreign F-35 person here on base before any of the pilots came. He did a really good job at setting us up and shaping not only the USAF but also Lockheed Martin as well, to a point now where they’re some of our greatest advocates. They do a really good job for us.”

The RAAF’s maintenance personnel at Luke are there under what’s called a pooling implementation arrangement across the 61st FS. They are all experienced technicians, most of whom have come from fast jets and, while a few of the RAAF maintainers at Luke will become trainers at the 2OCU ITC schoolhouse at Williamtown, the majority will form the core of 3SQN’s maintenance cadre as that unit ramps up operations in 2019 and 2020.

“It’s an OJT (on the job training) set-up, and we’ve got about 25 maintainers here,” Myles said. “The average experience is about 15 years on a given type, so we’ve got a good core of experience here, and they’ve been here for 12 to 18 months now.

“They initially did some training at Eglin AFB where the schoolhouse is, and depending on what training category they are, that was two to five months. From the schoolhouse they then came here, and from that moment they hit the ground running.”

Maintenance on the F-35 is conducted using Lockheed Martin’s Autonomic Logistics Information System, or ALIS, which provides all of the aircraft’s technical publications and joint technical data in a digital format, and allows data to be centralised for maintenance and fleet management. The ALIS system at the 61st FS is a Lockheed Martin system, whereas 3SQN is now using an RAAF system.

“Our maintainers really hit the ground running when they got here from the schoolhouse,” Myles explained. “They were into Lockheed with a whole bunch of really smart questions which was good. Lockheed understood the standard that our folks were at because of the groundwork laid by Bullet, so we’re able to get a bit more hands-on than otherwise might have happened.

“While our folks can work on the 61st FS’s jets, they can’t sign for the maintenance because Lockheed is responsible for it under the contractor system which mirrors the US Air Force instructions. We have Lockheed observing because they have to certify it, but the team gets a lot of first-hand experience.”

Moving forward, 10 RAAF F-35As will be based with the 61st FS at Luke until late 2020 or early 2021. Aircraft 009 and 010 which were delivered in August and September will ferry home in early December and aircraft 011 and 012 will then be delivered to Luke to make up the 10 aircraft commitment to the 61st FS, while all subsequent deliveries will be to 3SQN and then subsequent squadrons in Australia. ^

China’s Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) formally commissioned its second aircraft carrier on December 17 at a ceremony in Sanya.

Named Shandong and flying the CV-17 pennant number, the vessel is the first to be built from the keel up in China, but is based on China’s first carrier, the CV-16 Liaoning which entered service in 2014.

Liaoning was extensively rebuilt from the unfinished hulk of the Soviet-era carrier Varyag which was originally acquired from Ukraine in 1995 to supposedly serve as a floating casino in China.

Varyag was originally to have been a sister ship to Russia’s Admiral Kusnetsov which has suffered from poor reliability and a reported botched overhaul in recent years, including most recently a fatal onboard fire on December 12.

Shandong will reportedly be equipped with about 15 J-15B Flying Shark (based on the Sukhoi Su-33) fighters and its J-15D electronic warfare derivative, Z-8, Z-9 and Ka-32 helicopters, and possibly unmanned systems.

Its commissioning ceremony at the Hainan port of Sanya suggests it will be based in the PLA-N’s south seas fleet which covers the contested South China Sea region and its approaches.

The November-December 2019 issue of ADBR is now online for all readers to catch up on during the holiday period.

This feature appeared in the JAN-FEB 2019 issue of ADBR.

The equipment is here or on the way, but what is the RAAF doing to develop a next gen workforce? 

The Royal Australian Air Force is undergoing arguably the biggest transformation in its 98-year history. Not only has almost every platform in its inventory been recapitalised in the past decade and a half, the service is also having to re-skill and upskill much of its workforce to adapt to a whole new generation of capabilities. 

Air Commodore Geoff Harland joined the Royal Australian Air Force in 1985. During his career, he has flown as an Air Combat Officer on P-3C Orion, F-111C and F/A-18F Super Hornet.  

He has commanded 1SQN, 82WG, and Air Force Training Group as well as deploying as an Air Planner for INTERFET (East Timor), Director Air Operations Centre and Air Component Commander for Operation Sumatra Assist, and Director of the US Central Command’s 609th Combined Air Operations Centre in the Middle East.  

Outside Air Force, AIRCDRE Harland spent 18 months working for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) in aviation safety culminating in roles including Australian Safety Oversight Branch Manager. He was awarded the Conspicuous Service Cross in 2001, appointed as a Member of the Order of Australia and awarded the Distinguished Service Medal in 2017. He is currently the Director General Personnel – Air Force. 

AIRCDRE Harland is clearly an experienced operator with a clear focus on human resource management, and his role as Director General Personnel – Air Force is to oversee the transformation of the RAAF’s workforce to be able to safely and effectively operate the next generation of systems entering service. 

“We’re in a phase now where we are really reconsidering what works for Air Force in terms of workforce,” AIRCDRE Harland told ADBR. “Looking forward, we’re trying to understand and anticipate the future nature of work and emerging demographics to determine how we might better prepare ourselves and continue to generate good workforce outcomes now and into the future and in doing so stay ahead of the game.” 

Two of the key challenges of building a next gen workforce are the changing demographics of and demands for different skill-sets in Air Force and society in general.  

“The question we asked ourselves was, ‘what would a 5th generation air force mean from a workforce point of view?’,” he said. “We asked that question against the backdrop of the changing nature of work in the wider community, given that Air Force is drawn from the wider community. We are importantly an all-volunteer force, so the way we work and the way we operate needs to make sense to the wider community, we also need to ensure we remain viable and perform as an Air Force.” 

One of the opportunities Air Force has used to begin to re-shape was provided by Project Suakin which formalised the notion of a total workforce model. Launched in November 2013 by then VCDF AIRMSHL Mark Binskin, Project Suakin’s aim was to “improve the ADF’s ability to respond to future workforce challenges and changes in the security environment and the economy by giving it a more flexible workforce structure.” 

By using the Total Workforce Model (TWM) the Project Suakin aimed to “provide flexible career pathways, matching remuneration and benefits with capability delivered, enhanced workforce flexibility, simplified processes and helping to build an organisational culture that is more accepting of flexibility”. 

“What we’re looking at in the Air Force’s adoption of the TWM is the creation of a total workforce system which takes into account uniformed Air Force people who engage in a career in more flexible modes than in the past and may work in a casual, part-time or full-time way rather than the previous binary permanent or reserve Air Force construct,” AIRCDRE Harland explained.  

“We are now realising opportunities with casual workforce, readiness part-time work force, and standard part-time workforce which allow us to leverage off previous education, training and experience,” he added. “Add Public Service, industry and contractors and we have a more flexible Air Force total workforce system”. 

“We’re also exploring ways that we can consider the use of automation and artificial intelligence to deliver traditional workforce outcomes for Air Force. What we’re trying to do is basically move away from the management of a permanent workforce which has a little bit of reserve helping out, to the idea of a workforce system that has more flexibility for the people who we engage with, considers emerging technology and allows us to adapt as we look forward.” 

AIRCDRE Harland says he envisions the RAAF’s workforce model operating across three key time frames. “The first frame is what we call the ‘force-in-being’, which is operating the current force in that zero to three years frame and delivering the ‘now’,” he explained.  

“The second time frame is what is known as the ‘objective force’ in which the period nominally three to 10 years from now and drives the future workforce structure and development of our people to allow Air Force to realise the new capabilities that are generated through the capability life cycle.  

“The third time frame is beyond 10 years from now as we look at the aspirational future force which is really very difficult to define in the current context because the environment is rapidly changing, what we’re doing is looking and saying, ‘here are the things that we might need to anticipate’.” 

The RAAF has also increased its engagement and outreach to educational institutions to develop that future workforce. “In the cyber domain in particular we’re looking at generating a cyber workforce – cyber warfare officers and cyber warfare specialists as well as looking at electronics engineers who are network specialists, and also network technicians who will maintain our infrastructure.  

Another consideration is personnel retention and recruitment rates. Whereas Air Force has, in the past, struggled to retain key personnel such as pilots when civilian organisations are in an expansion phase and are hiring. Air Force maintains a close watch on external markets and has recently introduced a strategy to manage aircrew in a way to improve return on investment and increase resilience.  

“So right now, the macro level Air Force level doesn’t have a retention problem,” AIRCDRE Harland said. “We’re at around about seven per cent separation which is healthy, because we do need to refresh and regenerate.  

“There are pockets of Air Force which we’re seeing competition for talent outside,” he added. “And in those areas I think it’s really about what we can offer as a force, and how we can differentiate ourselves from an experience that an individual might get in industry.  

“We’re now allowing people to flow in and out of Air Force more than previously and in doing so we are able to access intellect and capacity of Air Force people as they’re moving in and out of uniform. So acknowledging the experience that they get outside in wider industry is actually really important to us, and it can bring some different perspectives back to Air Force which can really improve our performance.” 

AIRCDRE Harland added that Air Force doesn’t currently have any trouble with recruitment. “Right now, it’s exceptionally positive,” he said. “We don’t typically have trouble getting talent in the door, but we acknowledge that as we look forward into STEM related industry there’s going to be increasing competition for talent. So we need to be very clear on what the offer is for Air Force, have a system that makes sense to people, and also have some flexibility in the way that we engage with people. 

“While also considering workforce structure and policy, we’re also looking at the kind of behaviours that we would see successful people exhibiting in the future Air Force,” he added. “We’re exploring that area because, you can change structures and you can change policies, but until you actually really tap into cultural change and behavioural change, you can really end up returning to where you are now. So we’re doing work in terms of trying to understand and influence culture and behaviours.” 

He said recruiters were generally looking for candidates who have good communication skills, are critical thinkers, and who are good at collaborating. “With those three things as a baseline, they will be good contributors to their joint force. Provided they have the baseline technical skills and qualifications, we can teach the skills the Air Force needs, it’s much harder to influence soft skills and attitude.” 

I asked AIRCDRE Harland if, by looking for more flexibility in its workforce, was Air Force in danger of losing or degrading its technical mastery in specific trades and skill-sets.  

“Air Force by its nature has always been a technical force,” he said. “The way we describe professional mastery in Air Force is that it’s comprised of three elements: technical mastery, combat mastery and social mastery. In the early part of an individual’s career, they typically concentrate on getting good technical skills and generating technical mastery, whether it be in aviation, cyber, engineering et cetera.  

“Then as they move through their career they will work on their combat mastery, which is how they will apply their specialisation to generate air power effects,” he added. “And foundational to that is increasing social mastery, which is really about the ability to be able to communicate and influence in a really positive way across the ADF. 

“So to answer your question, the way that we structure an individual’s career will typically build them on a big pillar of technical mastery, and then we’ll broaden their skills in combat and social so they become more broadly adaptable across the force. 

“An important bottom line to our plans is that, as we look forward to increased flexibility to enable Air Force to continue to remain relevant in the future and access the talent and workforce capacity it requires, we must equally ensure that we remain fully viable as a military force. So as ever, it’s a careful balancing act.” AIRCDRE Harland stated. 

“The Chief (of Air Force) and Air Force’s senior leadership are very focused on the Air Force workforce, and I think we have an opportunity to further challenge ourselves with the difficult questions and improve and prevail in the future.” 

All images by ADF photographers

The Federal government has mobilised the ADF to support rescue and recovery operations for the ongoing bushfire crisis affecting NSW and Victoria.

Following a National Security Committee of Cabinet meeting on January 4, Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds, and Chief of Defence Force GEN Angus Campbell announced the mobilisation of 3,000 mostly-Army reservists, and various air, ground and maritime transport units and assets to support civilian agencies across the vast area of the fires.

The announcement comes after Navy MRH 90 helicopters had already been assisting the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) from September right through to December to conduct fire ground surveillance and mapping and transport services near Sydney and Army Tiger ARH helicopters provided similar services in northern NSW and southern Queensland using their infra-red sensors.

Civilian large aerial tanker aircraft and fire-fighting vehicles have also been utilising ADF base infrastructure for several months for refuelling and reloading, maintenance and other support services, while ADF geospatial intelligence has been provided for fire mapping.

Further, the ADF has been supporting RFS and other state emergency management agencies with Defence Liaison Officers, Army has provided ground transport, there have been dozens of RAAF C-17A, KC-30A, C-130J and C-27J air transport missions, Army personnel had been assisting with fire break clearing, and all services have provided catering, base and field accommodation, and other support.

Following the rapid escalation of fire activity in Victoria’s East Gippsland area on New Years Eve, the Victorian Government formally requested additional ADF support to assist with the transport of fire crews and equipment around the state, and the evacuation of residents and holiday-makers from communities isolated by fire activity.

The RAN immediately started preparing its on-call humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) vessel for the Christmas/new year period, HMAS Choules, and the training vessel MV Sycamore to sail for from Sydney. Choules was loaded with Army LARC amphibious watercraft, an MRH 90 helicopter, and containers of relief supplies. Both vessels sailed on the afternoon on January 1, arriving off Mallacoota in far eastern Victoria early the next morning.

Army’s 5 Aviation Regiment (5Avn) also generated three CH-47F Chinooks of C SQN which self-deployed from Townsville and arrived at RAAF East Sale on the evening of January 3. Two S-70B-9 Black Hawks from 6Avn self-deployed to East Sale from Holsworthy near Sydney, and a C-17A from 36SQN, a C-130J from 37SQN, and three RAAF C-27Js from 35SQN also deployed to East Sale.

With further extreme weather forecast for January 4 expected to impact fires burning along the NSW south coast and the alpine regions, the Governor General GEN David Hurley authorised the mobilisation of the reserves, and the Commonwealth committed additional assets to the effort.

The federal response has been divided into three major elements; Joint Task Force (JTF) 1111 to support operations in South Australia and Tasmania, JTF 1110 to cover the NSW and ACT areas, and JTF 646 to support operations in Victoria.

The LHD HMAS Adelaide was prepared to deploy from Sydney to Eden on the NSW far south coast, and sailed with two MH-60R helicopters, 300 tonnes of relief supplies, Navy amphibious watercraft, and augmented medical and catering crews.

An additional Chinook and four MRH 90s have self-deployed from Townsville and two more Chinooks are preparing to deploy, while Army combat engineers and aeromedical evacuation (AME) teams were also generated to support the effort across all three JTFs.

RAAF Air traffic controllers have established a flight information service at Bairnsdale Airport in Gippsland to support increased operations there, while an RAAF P-8A Poseidon has provided overhead reconnaissance between East Sale and Mallacoota for ground transport engineering requirements. Also providing aerial reconnaissance is an Army Wasp small unmanned aerial system (SUAS) element from the 20th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery.

Other Army elements are spread across all three JTFs. For JTF 1111, engineers, logistics capabilities and personnel from 9th Brigade have deployed to Kangaroo Island to assist with recovery and clean-up efforts there. JTF 1110 and JTF 646 comprises some 400 personnel from 7th Brigade to support the state emergency services, while additional scoping and advice support have been provided to the ACT in case fires in the alpine region move north towards Canberra.

International military support has also been provided, with New Zealand deploying three RNZAF NH90s to RAAF Edinburgh via RAAF C-17A to bolster transport support in South Australia, and Singapore self-deploying two RSAF CH-47D Chinooks from Oakey in Queensland to East Sale.

By John Conway

This article appeared in the NOV-DEC 2019 issue of ADBR

For Colonel Muammar Gadaffi and the Libyan military, a ten-minute window in the early hours of April 15 1986 would have been complete chaos. With radars and communications being jammed and command and control systems paralysed, there was little that could be done to prevent 60 tonnes of precision ordnance raining down from the night sky. 

Although it happened over 30 years ago, the US raid on Libya –dubbed Operation El Dorado Canyon – provides some enduring themes that are relevant to contemporary strategic circumstances, especially when examining the real-world constraints that combine to add significant difficulty to the planning of long-range strikes. 

In modern parlance, Gadaffi had been operating in the grey zone. He was not formally at war with the US, but was sponsoring terrorism and radical anti-government organisations. He had established a sophisticated anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capability, and was not afraid to work outside the rules-based international order.  

Yet despite widespread state-sponsored terrorist attacks by Libya across Europe over many years, the US was left to act unilaterally in sending a message to the persistent and menacing threat posed by Gadaffi; and that message was sent via a long-range precision strike.   

CRISIS MANAGEMENT 

It is not difficult to imagine a future scenario in the Indo-Pacific where Australia may be challenged by a regional actor or becomes a victim of state-sponsored terrorism. To protect Australia’s interests, the ADF must develop and retain the ability to conduct precision strike in pursuit of limited strategic objectives against a military target. This strike must also be conducted in a way that retains the element of surprise and avoids or minimises collateral damage.   

In a crisis management situation – falling short of full-scale war involving actors with highly integrated economic and trading relationships – a strike mission takes on additional complexity and requires a co-ordinated whole-of-government effort.  

The ability and capacity to generate a sovereign strike is beyond the means of most foreign military forces, especially when the mission involves targets at strategic distances. Without capability and mass, it is not possible to demonstrate combat power at the scale necessary to signal strategic intent.  

As the US demonstrated during El Dorado Canyon, ingenuity and sophisticated planning can overcome many operational constraints, provided there is appropriate force structure, a well-trained military and, crucially, the political will to act unilaterally. 

SOVEREIGN STRIKE CRITERIA  

Sovereign strike refers to the ability to recognise a strategic opportunity, then use deception and surprise to act decisively and with precision in space and time, without dependency on other states.   

For a maritime power, sovereign strike is akin to a commando raid by the joint force through air, sea and space – including cyberspace – that exploits a limited window of opportunity and at a speed that forces a belligerent adversary into a defensive mindset.  

It must avoid reliance on others to provide access, basing and overflight permission, and must maintain the element of surprise by avoiding the large-scale forward deployment of forces. It must have overwhelming firepower to penetrate sophisticated defences and reach a target beyond the horizon. And it must conduct battle damage assessment that provides factual evidence to further isolate an adversary and prevent revision of history through the exploitation of information.  

Electronic warfare played a central role during mission execution of the raid on Libya. Yet, a sovereign strike capability must now consider cyberspace and the information domain. Fighting the information battle alongside the physical domains can prevent an adversary undermining the international legitimacy of a sovereign strike and retaliating at the strategical level. The sovereign strike must have a coherent narrative and a defensive cyber plan alongside EW, strike, tanker and other plans. 

THE GREY ZONE – 1980s STYLE 

In the years leading up to the Op El Dorado Canyon raid, Libyan leader Gadaffi had provoked the US by illegally claiming Libyan territory to the south of a “Line of Death” on the 32° 30′ N latitude, which included all of the 560km wide Gulf of Sidra.  

In response, the US Navy conducted freedom of navigation exercises in the disputed territory, and on March 24, a Libyan S-200 (SA-5) fired at F-14A Tomcats flying combat air patrol (CAP). The F-14s, supported by EA-6B Prowler aircraft, survived the attack but US Government patience had now run out. President Ronald Reagan issued an ultimatum to Gadaffi to cease supporting international terrorism and withdraw all extra-territorial claims. 

But Gadaffi called Reagan’s bluff. The tipping point was on April 5 1986 when a terrorist bomb destroyed the La Belle night club in Berlin, a discotheque popular with Americans. The explosion killed a US soldier and his partner, and injured over 200 civilians including 75 US citizens. Communications intelligence unequivocally linked Gadaffi to the bombing, thus giving President Reagan the justification to retaliate with a limited air strike on Libya. 

Launching a full-scale military campaign against Libya involving land forces was out of the question, with economic and political risks and interdependencies impacted by disrupted Libyan oil supplies and the ongoing commitment to the Cold War.   

The US was also unable to rely upon the universal support of some of its Cold War allies, with France, Spain, Italy and Germany all denying access, basing and overflight rights for the operation. Only Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would agree to the use of UK bases for the raid, on the condition that it would minimise civilian casualties and only strike targets directly associated with terrorism. Like many other western countries, the UK had expatriate workers living in Libya employed by multi-national oil companies.   

The consequences of this agreement would be to constrain planners and result in highly restrictive rules of engagement for the aircrew who were required to positively identify their assigned target on multiple systems, and abort if weapon-guidance or navigation systems were not fully functional.  

THE RAID 

Nine days after the Berlin bombing, at 17:36 on April 14 1986, 24 US Air Force F-111F fighter bombers launched from RAF Lakenheath in the UK accompanied by five EF-111A Raven electronic warfare variants from nearby RAF Upper Heyford. In radio silence they completed the first of 12 air-to-air refuelling brackets 90 minutes into the 13 hour, 10,000km roundtrip mission.   

Despite the strategic distances flown in the raid, it is considered a tactical strike mission, as the five targets were military in nature and did not target Libya’s civilian infrastructure.    

The only strategic assets used in the raid were 28 air refuelling tankers launched from RAF Mildenhall and RAF Fairford, with many arriving from the US mainland and elsewhere in the two days preceding the strike. Intelligence and targeting support to the tactical planners was provided by the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA).   

Six spare F-111Fs and one EF-111 returned to base after the first tanker bracket. The remainder switched off their IFF transponders and flew in close formation with the KC-10 and KC-135 tankers to deceive and prevent detection by ground-based radar controllers.   

The F-111s flew around the Iberian Peninsula and entered the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar, taking a starboard turn at Malta to attack the Libyan capital Tripoli at 02:00 on April 15 at low level, employing terrain-following radar, the AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack electro-optical targeting pod and GBU-10 2,000lb laser-guided bombs. 

Ten minutes before the attack, the four EF-111 Raven and 14 US Marine Corps carrier-based EA-6B Prowler electronic attack aircraft began jamming Libyan radars and communications. As Libyan air defences came online they were hit by 48 anti-radiation missiles. Over a dozen systems were destroyed during the raid.  

Meanwhile, US Navy and US Marine Corps aircraft from the US Mediterranean 6^th Fleet, USS Saratoga, USS America, and USS Coral Sea, simultaneously attacked the city and surrounding area of Benghazi on the eastern side of the Gulf of Sidra. According to the American Intelligence Journal, the raid involved 18 A-6E Intruders and A-7E Corsairs, and six F/A-18A Hornets carrying a mix of 500lb bombs and anti-radiation missiles (ARM). Air defence coverage was provided by F-14A Tomcats and E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, while numerous helicopters provided combat search and rescue support. 

All five targets were hit, and later confirmed by three USAF SR-71A Blackbird sorties from RAF Mildenhall which conducted battle damage assessment (BDA) of the targets on April 16, flying through Libyan airspace at Mach 3.5 and more than 80,000 feet.  

Gadaffi survived the raid because he was personally notified half an hour earlier by an official from Malta who provided early warning of multiple unidentified combat aircraft heading towards Libya. He would go on to avenge the attack with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988, killing 270 people.   

Operation El Dorado Canyon was a highly synchronised joint operation, and the longest tactical fighter combat mission in history. New technology played a key role: the mission was the combat debut for the Pave Tack pod and the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), and demonstrated the increasingly sophisticated integration of intelligence into air operations which accelerated during the latter stages of the Vietnam War, especially in regards to the suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD). 

With only tactical precision guided bombs available at the time (systems such as the JASSM Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile only entered service around 2009) a purely kinetic attack would have been extremely high-risk generating a requirement for the suppression of the IADS for long enough to allow the penetration and egress of the strike aircraft.  

GREY ZONE TECHNOLOGY 

The mission had been originally conceived with a much smaller number of F-111Fs, as senior planners were concerned that such a large formation would limit the element of surprise. In human factors terms, the element of surprise was an essential planning consideration because it would trigger an emotional rather than cognitive response from the adversary.  

However, a balance needed to be struck since the reliability of the Pave Tack system and President Reagan’s stringent ROE requirements were such that there was a risk the mission would fail due to insufficient serviceable aircraft able to penetrate the IADS and reach the targets. 

Furthermore, Libya had developed one of the world’s most effective integrated air defence systems based upon technology and technical support from the Soviet Union. They employed long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAM) such as the SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6 and SA-8, and advanced anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) such as the ZSU-23-4.  

The Libyan IADS introduced additional complexity since it was not a purely Soviet ‘red’ system. The introduction of ‘blue’ radar systems from UK, France and Germany added ambiguities and, in doing so, created a ‘grey’ IADS which resulted in significant jamming problems for both the EF-111 and EA-6B aircraft, whose threat databases were optimised for ‘red’ threats.   

To counter the Libyan IADS more convincingly, the USAF would have ideally employed its specialised ‘Electronic Warfare Triad’ which routinely trained together and shared command, control and intelligence arrangements.   

The triad formed the basis of the USAF SEAD capability in Cold War Europe employing the EF-111, the F-4G Wild Weasel, and the EC-130H Compass Call communications jammer. However, the Wild Weasels were based at Spangdahlem and the Compass Calls at Sembach, both USAF Europe air bases in Germany, and were therefore unavailable for the raid.   

Furthermore, the F-4Gs would have introduced an additional air refuelling burden and, even if they had been flown to the UK for the raid, from a counter-intelligence perspective their redeployment could have signalled US intentions. The Compass Calls would also have been useful from a base closer to Libya, but their comparatively slow speed would have compromised the need for a high-speed transit and attack.  

In the end, the UK-based EF-111s combined with the EA-6B Prowlers and other HARM shooters from the 6^th Fleet to meet the SEAD requirement for the strike despite doctrinal and training differences. Electronic warfare system interoperability was ensured by each platform operating the ALQ-99, a modified and updated version of which is still used today by the US Navy and RAAF EA-18G Growler.    

The joint task force achieved the mission with the loss of only a single aircraft – F-111F ‘Karma 52’ and its crew – despite the relative lack of prior integration and different single-service concepts of operation. It also demonstrated further progress in the development of SEAD as a core element of offensive counter air (OCA) operations.   

FAST FORWARD 

The US sovereign strike on Libya in 1986 stands in time as an example of combat agility. With an overwhelming ‘need to do something’ to meet a strategic Government policy objective, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff provided President Reagan with five targets and a brilliant plan, despite extraordinary real-world constraints and a narrow window of opportunity to strike. 

Without first-choice aircraft and basing options available, and in the face of a sophisticated and networked Libyan IADS, the US joint task force employed SEAD tactics to deceive, deny, disrupt and degrade Libyan decision-making capacity to the point where it exposed its vulnerability to a high-speed attack.     

In the years since Operation El Dorado Canyon, technology has further transformed the potency of conventional strike capability, with the introduction of long-range stand-off weapons, advanced sensors, and the increasing integration of command and control and ISR systems. Information-related technologies have also introduced new opportunities and new threats. The introduction of systems such as the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) to replace the ALQ-99 system on the EA-18G will be a major step forward, but perhaps the biggest transformation will come in the form of next-generation unmanned systems that will add mass and capacity to a sovereign strike capability.   

However, some things have not changed, especially the constraints introduced by access, basing and overflight requirements, and the willingness to act independently and alone without a broad base of international support. Thus, the raid demonstrated the importance of ensuring a sovereign strike capability avoids being defined by a single service, platform, or weapon system. Instead it must be considered in terms of its attributes and utility to operate in war and, more likely, in a crisis management situation.  

Above all, sovereign strike capability must continually evolve and develop within a joint force mindset and drive integration across the entire defence enterprise to execute a ‘kill chain’ in the tightest possible time window while maintaining the element of surprise. 

This article proposes some general criteria for a future sovereign strike capability, but it still requires a central idea to add potency and lethality.  New ideas will come with the arrival of new technologies and platforms, and traditional concepts such as the ‘EW Triad’ and SEAD can be given a new lease on life based upon networked joint capabilities and manned-unmanned teaming. 

The next edition of ADBR will compare and contrast Operation El Dorado Canyon with the NATO-led strikes on Libya 25 years later during Operation Odyssey Dawn. It will examine the friction points and complexity when operating within a coalition.  

By Brigadier (Retd) Nicholas Jans, OAM, PhD 

This article appeared in the January-February 2019 issue of ADBR

Well-honed skills for challenging circumstances  

Intelligent, physically superior, adaptable, imaginative and brave, easy to lead but difficult to drive, the Australian soldier was proof that individualism is the best and not the worst foundation upon which to build collective discipline.
– General Sir John Monash, Australian commander in WW1. 

One of the Australian Army’s greatest advantages is the expectation that soldiers will question their leaders’ decisions and make appropriate suggestions when they think it is warranted. 
– Major General (Ret’d)/Senator Jim Molan. 

This article, the second of three drawn from my recent book Leadership Secrets of the Australian Army, outlines some of the defining practices of the Army’s distinctive leadership practices.  

Military leadership is perceived by many civilians as top-down and directive, ie ‘command and control’, but the reality is very different. Military units are routinely required to deal with risk and uncertainty, in situations where leadership – the process of focusing team energy and lifting performance beyond expectations – is essential to good results. So our military spends a lot of time thinking about leadership and developing the skills of its practitioners at all levels and career stages. 

Leadership practice 

Australian military leaders practise a values-based style that is both authoritative and inclusive.  

Authoritative leaders earn trust by their professionalism and problem-solving ability. They are expert in the things that matter to a team: role models for their particular functions. Whatever the challenges, they can consistently deliver. What they say and do invariably makes sense, and others learn to trust their judgement and their motives.  

‘Authoritative’ doesn’t mean ‘authoritarian’. Authoritarian leaders – what we might call ‘taskmasters’ – run things by edict and close control. In contrast, authoritative leaders often draw the team into the process, delegating whenever possible. Far from weakening their authority, this invariably strengthens the bonds between them and their followers.  

The typical style is to lead by example, consistent with the institutional values of courage, initiative, respect and teamwork. This demands that leaders set high standards that, explicitly and implicitly, tend to draw out similar levels of commitment from others. They can drive others hard because they drive themselves hard, rarely asking others to take on challenges that they themselves are not prepared to face, and frequently getting out and about when conditions are tough, pitching in with routine tasks and sweating it with the troops. 

This has been commonplace in the Australian military for more than a century. As Australia geared up for the Boer War and World War I, it found itself recruiting from a population with distinctively different perspectives on social authority than prevailed in the British Isles.  

To their credit, the leaders of that era accepted this reality and, by fusing post-colonial cultural values such as egalitarianism and initiative with the imperatives of warfighting, they helped to develop a distinctively ‘Australian’ style of leadership – a style that became a priceless asset in battlefield capability and resilience.  

Now, fine-tuned by each successive generation, this is embedded as a way of both practising and thinking about leadership that ticks all the boxes that define contemporary best practice. 

This style is embodied in what a recent Australian leadership study dubbed the ‘Captain-Coach’, reflecting an Australian archetype – the ‘first-among-equals’ community expert who routinely contributes beyond normal expectations to help others to lift their individual and team performance. And, not surprisingly, it’s how most Australians prefer to be led. 

The Captain-Coach mode of leadership taps into the full set of human needs: the sense of security of being led by someone with competence and confidence; the satisfaction of social connection with that leader and with others in the group and with the larger entity to which that group belongs; the self-confidence and self-esteem that stems from being treated as a respected colleague by a trusted leader; and the self-actualisation and growth that comes from doing good work in good company. 

And by doing so, it consistently delivers a ‘1+1+1 = 4’ effect. 

Insight into the leader-follower process has recently been enhanced by the application of neuroscience. For example, a number of studies have shown that the kind of leadership described above triggers the release of neurochemicals such as oxytocin (the ‘bonding molecule’), serotonin (‘confidence’) and adrenaline (‘energy’). Their stimulating effects on brain functioning and mood amplify the conscious/rational reactions to being well led, thus making what ‘makes sense’ also what ‘feels good’. 

This double reinforcement is often felt by leaders themselves. As they see evidence of improved followership, they will often experience the same kinds of neurological stimuli, thus making it more likely that they will continue on that path.  

And this flags an important point. Leaders who are better at analysing their own behaviour and influence are likely to go from strength to strength. Conversely, those who can’t or won’t self-analyse will be less likely and less able to see what’s working and what’s not – to their detriment as well as to that of the team. 

A team effort 

The second major factor that underpins the strength of our military’s leadership is its approach to teamwork. 

Again, the stereotype of military teams is of rigid hierarchy in which every member knows his/her place. But again, the reality is quite different. Military units are organised in ways that get the best from the total team, with supporting networks for virtually every leadership position. 

For example, an infantry company comprises three platoons, each commanded by a junior officer supported by a platoon sergeant and the three corporals who head up the component sections. In turn, the company commander is assisted by a 2IC and a company sergeant major. While command is officially exercised by the various officers, their capacity to do so is significantly facilitated by those supporting networks. 

This inclusive mode of leadership is reflected in an equivalent approach to organisational leadership. At every level things are run on a ‘teams-of-teams’ basis, with small teams operating as the building blocks of larger configurations. Such arrangements mean the focus for action and decision-making can vary according to circumstances, with the precise configuration determined by the task and situation.  

Adaptability at every level is facilitated by a doctrine known as ‘mission command’ which requires leaders at all levels to empower subordinate leaders by providing them with the autonomy and information they need to tackle specific objectives semi-autonomously within an overall plan. Those subordinate leaders are then left to get on with their part of the operation, keeping the central leader informed on progress and issues as necessary. 

This ‘teams-of-teams’ form has a host of advantages. As a channel for leadership, it taps the collective resources within the network, provides multiple channels of information for decision-making, and frees up leaders at each level to focus on and manage local relationships and emerging opportunities and threats. As a means of coordination, it keeps the important decision-making points close to where they will be enacted, and helps to readily shift focus when circumstances change. And as a way of building human capital, it helps to develop strong teamwork and followership, and – very much not least – broadens the leadership capabilities of all those within the network.  

Good leaders go to a lot of effort to build a strong sense of team identity and esprit de corps. This helps those in their teams to readily go the extra yard for their comrades and to stick to the task when conditions are tough or dangerous. 

Developing leadership capability  

Good leaders connect with their followers’ hearts as well as with their heads. Working for them is often a deeply satisfying and personally enhancing experience. 

There’s still a lot spoken about ‘natural leadership’, but the closer you get to it the more you realise that it is essentially a mirage. Good leadership invariably stems from hard work and ways of thinking that depend on character and values as well as experience and understanding. 

The third and final instalment on this topic will describe how our military tackles leadership development.  

By Jyri Raitasalo 

This article appeared in the March-April 2019 issue of ADBR

IT IS TIME TO BURST THE A2AD BUBBLE 

Quite a lot of the discussion about Air and Missile Defences (AMD) in Europe – and elsewhere – has revolved around the concept of Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD).  

Supposedly Russia has implemented a successful A2AD-strategy in Europe in order to get an advantage over NATO in a potential future war. A significant part of this strategy – so the A2AD narrative goes – has been related to Russia’s new long-range air and missile defence systems. In particular, the S-400 Triumf has become a symbol of this A2AD threat.  

Maps containing circles with a 400km radius (the proclaimed maximum range of one missile variant of the S-400 system) are commonplace in newsfeed and analysis about military affairs in Europe. Allegedly, and based on ‘evidence’ presented in maps with A2AD circles, Russia can prevent or seriously hamper potential Western air operations due to the advanced characteristics of its S-400 AMD systems. 

There is one problem with this Russian A2AD strategy – It does not exist. A2AD is a Western concept, one that is focused on contemporary and projected future vulnerabilities of Western militaries that, for more than 20 years, have focused on military crisis management, counter-terrorism operations and counter-insurgency warfare.  

This has taken place in the absence of any meaningful air or missile defence threats to intervening Western air forces. Thus, during the post-Cold War era many Western states have shed much of their own air defence capabilities and the associated expertise related to air warfare in contested environments.  

In short, much of the Western discourse on A2AD is based on Western shortcomings and is directed to Western audiences. Russia does not have an A2AD strategy, nor does it use the word to describe its policies or strategy related to the modernisation of its aid and missile defence capabilities. 

And force modernisation is the key explanatory factor for Russia’s advances in the field of air and missile defences. When it comes to warfighting, Russia is first and foremost a land power, and its military is an Army-heavy fighting organisation. For Russia, the so-called A2AD ‘bastions’ in the Kola Peninsula, Saint Petersburg area and in Kaliningrad are defensive formations which are needed to protect its critical infrastructure and fighting forces, ie the Army, in the case of war.  

It is worth remembering that the Kola Peninsula hosts a significant portion of Russia’s nuclear deterrence and warfighting capability. Similarly, the Saint Petersburg area has military significance in addition to its administrative and economic importance. Finally, Kaliningrad is an exclave between two NATO member-states, Poland and Lithuania.  

Defending Kaliningrad in wartime without nuclear weapons is almost impossible, and conceptualising Russia’s military capabilities and actions within a framework of A2AD leads to a distorted view of its strategy or operational concepts. This will lead to wrong policy recommendations within the West if military leaders and policymakers over-emphasise the Russian A2AD strategy. 

The introduction of the S-400 air and missile defence system originated from the need to replace older Soviet S-300 capabilities that have been designed and produced since the 1970s. The S-300 family comprises several major variants with various modifications like the S-300V, S-300P, S-300 PMU, and a dozen different other sub-variants. 

Some versions of the S-300 family such as the S-300PMU-1 and S-300PMU-2 were manufactured in Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Looking at this lineage, the S-400 is the newest answer of the Russian defence industry to the decades-old problem of defending the territory and fighting forces in a potential war against a developed adversary.  

It was introduced in the late 1990s and started to be deployed to the Russian Armed Forces during the first decade of the new millennium. In addition, China has already bought the system, while Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, India and Iraq have also expressed a desire to do so. 

From a Western perspective, the concept of A2AD makes sense. After all, before 2014 the Western European military perspective had developed and matured for more than 20 years based on the lessons of post-Cold War conflicts. These include the 1991 Gulf War, the air wars over Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), the first phases of air operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and also the air war against Gaddafi’s Libya in 2011.  

All of these operations showcased the prowess of Western (mostly American) military superiority and airpower in the contemporary international system. But suddenly, in 2014 and the following years, relations between Russia and the West soured, and the possibility of a military confrontation in Europe between NATO and Russia returned to the scene. For the first time in decades, Western European states needed to think about a potential adversary that has good air and missile defence systems in its inventory. 

It is worth noting that the very concept of A2AD was first developed to address the military challenge that China poses for the United States. In 2010 the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report described the challenge that China posed, noting: “The Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities.”  

Thus, When Russia made its move against Ukraine in 2014 – first in the Crimean Peninsula and later in Eastern Ukraine – the concept of A2AD had already made its debut. The concept was ‘hijacked’ from the Pacific theatre and transferred to Europe. It seemed to provide some guidance on how to assess Russia’s actions in a situation where Western military concepts and doctrines had neglected great power competition and state-on-state warfare for more than two decades. 

A2AD has become a buzzword that is rapidly losing its analytical utility. For several years it represented the Western need to (re)focus on air and missile defences, either developing one’s own AMD capabilities that had been neglected for years or developing needed suppression or destruction of enemy air defence capabilities (SEAD/DEAD) in order to facilitate air operations in contested environments.  

It is no wonder that the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Richardson banned the use of “A2AD” in the Navy as jargon two and half years ago. Unfortunately getting rid of buzzwords is not easy. Easy or not, now is the time to get rid of the concept that distorts reality. It is time to burst the Western narrative of Russia’s impenetrable A2AD bubbles. 

The RAAF’s 49^th and final Pilatus PC-21 advanced trainer has arrived in Australia and was handed over in a ceremony at RAAF East Sale in Victoria on December 6.

The PC-21s are being delivered to the RAAF under the Project AIR 5428 Pilot Training Systems (PTS), and will replace the Pilatus PC-9/A in service as the ADF’s advanced fixed-wing training aircraft.

The first two aircraft arrived in Australia in March 2017, and entered service in August 2017. The final PC-21 was accepted by the Head of Air Force Capability AVM Cath Roberts (above), and the Minister for Veterans and Defence Personnel and local member for Gippsland, Darren Chester.

“Undergraduate pilots at RAAF East Sale and Pearce will now be able to use the best equipment along with a new tailored Pilot Training System, which will meet their needs and those of future recruits,” Mr Chester said in a statement. “The new system can train more people faster and to a higher standard, and will ensure undergraduate pilots develop the necessary skills before moving to more advanced military aircraft.

“From early 2020, the PC-21 will also be used for flight test and evaluation at RAAF Base Edinburgh and forward air control at RAAF Base Williamtown.”

The forward air control role is performed by 4SQN at RAAF Williamtown, and its four PC-21s will be painted in a grey livery. The PC-21 will also be flown by The Roulettes display team and, as with the previous PC-9/A, all aircraft based at the Central Flying School (CFS) at East Sale have been painted in The Roulettes’ livery.

The final PC-21’s arrival and acceptance coincided with the December 5 conclusion of the final PC-9/A Advanced Pilots Training ‘Wings’ course at 2FTS at RAAF Pearce near Perth. The PC-9/A entered service with the ADF in 1988, and has trained thousands of ADF aircrew from all three services.

The RAN has formally opened an expanded Maritime Warfare Centre (MWC), an entity that will integrate the former smaller Australian Maritime Warfare Centre (AMWC) and the service’s test and evaluation into a single organisation.

Previously responsible for maritime warfare policy, doctrine and tactics, the AMWC was also responsible for the Fleet Cross Force Capability Division, signature analysis and ranging, weapon system performance, operational analysis in conjunction with Defence Science and Technology (DST) Group, and the Fleet Operational Knowledge Exploitation Cell.

The integration of the Royal Australian Navy Test and Evaluation Authority (RANTEA) will enable the MWC to provide expanded test and evaluation, tactical development and operational analysis throughout the capability life cycle. It has been located at Fleet Base East at Garden Island in Sydney.

“The First Principles Review and the National Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise has driven Navy to re-think how they provide warfighting support,” Director of the Maritime Warfare Centre, CAPT David Frost said in a statement. “Continuous shipbuilding requires continuous design, testing, and tactical development, and Navy is evolving to meet this challenge.”

“We will continue to apply scientific, engineering, and deep warfare experience to understand what our ships, submarines, and aircraft are capable of, and how we can get the most out of them when called upon”, he added. “We will establish Test and Tactics Development Teams that will support Navy Programs from inception to completion. They will plan, collect and analyse data that will inform critical decisions about current and future systems.

“In parallel, warfare program and operational analysis teams will collaborate with agencies to develop plans across sea control, littoral, integrated air and missile defence and information warfare domains. These plans will provide the battle rhythm for all trials, ensuring the right systems are tested at the right time to support the right decisions.”